Pew Research Center

There are many religious groups around the world that are not presented separately in this report due to their relatively small size and the limitations of national censuses and other data sources. These groups include Baha’is, Jains, Shintoists, Sikhs, Daoists (also spelled Taoists), Wiccans, Zoroastrians and numerous others, some of which are commonly described as folk or traditional religions. Because the groups in this category are very diverse, people in this category may not share the same beliefs and practices. The groups within this category also may have quite different demographic profiles. However, combining these groups into an umbrella category – all “other religions”– allows us to explore overall trends among people who identify as something other than Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish or religiously unaffiliated. Global change The estimated number of people in other religions grew worldwide by 12%, from 154 million to 172 million, between 2010 and 2020. The world’s overall population grew at roughly the same pace, and as a result, the share of the global population that falls into the “other religions” category remained stable at about 2%. Regional change The absolute number (or count) of adherents of other religions grew in every region. In the Asia-Pacific region, where most people in the “other religions” category live, their count grew to 113 million (up 3%) – their lowest growth rate in any region. Meanwhile, their number doubled to 20 million in the Latin America-Caribbean area (up 101%). In North America, the small population of people in other religions rose above 5 million (up 62%). The percentage of residents belonging to other religions grew in three regions, fell in two regions, and was stable in the Middle East-North Africa region. In Latin America and the Caribbean, people in other religions made up 3% of the overall public in 2020, up about 1 percentage point from 2010. They now account for a larger segment of residents of Latin America and the Caribbean than they do of Asia-Pacific residents. The “other religions” category also grew in Europe and North America, but by less than 1 percentage point. Meanwhile, the share of people in other religions declined by less than 1 percentage point in the Asia-Pacific region and sub-Saharan Africa. In both places, the “other religions” category made up less than 3% of the regional population in 2020. Regional distribution of people of other religions Between 2010 and 2020, the share of the world’s “other religions” population living in the Asia-Pacific region fell to 65% (down 6 points), and the share living in the Latin America-Caribbean region increased to 12% (up 5 points). The percentage of people in other religions living in North America grew to 3% (up 1 point). Less change occurred in other regions. Countries with the highest counts of people of other religions China is the country with the world’s largest number of people who fall into the “other religions” category. While only 3% of the country’s population identifies with other religions, China has such a large population that this translates to 25% of all adherents of other religions around the world. In China, some common religions in this category include Daoism and Chinese folk religion, such as the worship of Mazu, the Chinese sea goddess, and Guan Gong, also known as the god of wealth. India also has a very large population of people in other religions, including many Sikhs and Jains. The 36 million Indians in the “other religions” category constitute one-in-five people in this group globally. The 10 places with the highest counts of people in other religions combined were home to 129 million, or 75%, of their worldwide population. Where did the ‘other religions’ share of the population change the most? We identified only one country in which the percentage of people belonging to other religions shifted substantially (by at least 5 percentage points): Guinea-Bissau. The share of Guinea-Bissau residents who belong to other religions declined to 11% (down 7 points) between 2010 and 2020. During this period, the share of residents who are religiously unaffiliated grew by 9 points, to 12%. How is ‘substantial change’ defined? This section highlights countries that experienced substantial change in the size of their religious populations between 2010 and 2020. We focus on cases where a religious group’s share of a country’s population grew or shrank by at least 5 percentage points. We set that threshold because wide variations in data sources make it difficult to test the statistical significance of differences in population estimates in 2010 and 2020. Refer to the Methodology for details. Recommended Citation: Hackett, Conrad, Marcin Stonawski, Yunping Tong, Stephanie Kramer, Anne Shi and Dalia Fahmy. 2025. “How the Global Religious Landscape Changed From 2010 to 2020.” Pew Research Center. doi: 10.58094/fj71-ny11. source

ABOUT PEW RESEARCH CENTER Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan, nonadvocacy fact tank that informs the public about the issues, attitudes and trends shaping the world. It does not take policy positions. The Center conducts public opinion polling, demographic research, computational social science research and other data-driven research. Pew Research Center is a subsidiary of The Pew Charitable Trusts, its primary funder. source

Since the start of the Israel-Hamas war, several international actors have been working to broker peace, including Egypt, Qatar and the United States. Meanwhile, the war has paused normalization efforts with Saudi Arabia and increased military tensions with Iran. Israelis broadly agree that the U.S. is helpful in working toward lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians (81%) and that Iran is harmful (87%). Opinions on Egypt are split. Other international influences we asked about – including the United Nations – are seen as more harmful to peace efforts than helpful. Though most see the U.S. as helpful, 50% of Israelis also say President Donald Trump favors the Israeli side too much in his foreign relations. Only 2% say he favors the Palestinian side too much, while 42% say he favors each side the right amount. Looking to the future, four-in-ten Israelis think it is likely that the international community will recognize an independent Palestinian state in the next five years. About half (51%) think this is unlikely. Views of international influences About eight-in-ten Israelis say the U.S. is helpful (81%) in the work toward lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians, including 51% who say it is very helpful. Another 15% say the U.S. is somewhat or very harmful to peace efforts. There is also broad consensus on Iran’s influence: 87% of Israelis say Iran is harmful in the work toward lasting peace. This includes 80% who say it is very harmful. (Since the start of the war, Iran has launched two major missile attacks on Israel in April and October 2024.) The Israeli public is split on whether Egypt is helpful (44%) or harmful (41%). But twice as many say Egypt is very harmful as say it is very helpful (24% vs. 12%). Roughly a third of Israelis (35%) say Saudi Arabia is helpful in working toward lasting peace (35%), while 29% say the same about Qatar. More believe these countries are harmful (46% and 61%, respectively), including 44% who say Qatar’s influence is very harmful. About a fifth of Israelis say the United Nations is helpful to peace efforts, while 66% say it is harmful. Earlier in 2025, the Israeli government moved to ban UNRWA, the main UN aid agency in Gaza and the West Bank, arguing that employees of the organization have links to Hamas. Around one-in-ten Israelis surveyed say China is helpful (9%) in working toward peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Israelis are about as likely to say China is harmful (40%) as they are to say it has no influence (36%). Views by ethnicity Large shares of Jewish and Arab Israelis agree the U.S. is helpful to peace efforts, though Jews are more likely to say this than Arabs (88% vs. 55%). Israeli Arabs are more likely than Israeli Jews to see every other international actor we asked about as helpful, by a significant margin. For example, seven-in-ten Arab Israelis see Qatar as helpful, compared with 19% Jewish Israelis – a difference of 51 points. Arabs are also far more likely than Jews to perceive a helpful influence from the United Nations (+49), Egypt (+34), China (+30) and Saudi Arabia (+24). Small shares of Arab and Jewish Israelis see Iran as helpful, though Arabs are again more likely to say this than Jews (12% vs. 1%). Views by ideology Israelis on the left are more likely than those on the right to see various international actors as helpful in the work toward lasting peace. The only exception is the U.S., which 67% of Israelis on the left see as very or somewhat helpful, compared with 85% of those in the center and 86% of those on the right. Amid allegations of financial connections between aides close to Netanyahu and the Qatari government, just 11% of Israelis on the right – Netanyahu’s political base – see Qatar as helpful to peace efforts. Larger shares of those on the left (64%) and in the center (36%) say this. Around half or more on the left and in the center see Egypt and Saudi Arabia as helpful in working toward peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Roughly a quarter or fewer of right-leaning Israelis agree. About half of left-leaning Israelis (49%) see the UN as helpful, while much smaller shares of Israelis in the center (16%) and on the right (5%) feel this way. Israelis on the left are also more likely to say China is helpful (25%) than those in the center (9%) or on the left (2%). There is more agreement on Iran: 5% or fewer across the ideological spectrum say it is helpful in facilitating long-term peace, with right-leaning Israelis the least likely to say this. Views of Trump’s approach to the conflict Half of the Israeli public say U.S. President Donald Trump favors the Israelis too much in his foreign relations, while only 2% feel he favors Palestinians too much. Around four-in-ten (42%) say he favors each group the right amount. A year ago, 27% of Israelis said then-President Joe Biden was favoring Israelis too much, 25% said he favored Palestinians too much and 41% said he favored each group the right amount. Related: How Americans view Israel and the Israel-Hamas war at the start of Trump’s second term Roughly nine-in-ten Arab Israelis (92%) say Trump is favoring Israelis too much, while 40% of Jewish Israelis feel the same. Among Jewish Israelis, more say he’s favoring each group the right amount (51%) than favoring Israelis too much (40%). Israelis on the ideological left are much more likely than those in the center or on the right to say Trump favors Israelis too much. About eight-in-ten left-leaning Israelis say this (84%), while 52% of those in the center and 34% of those on the right agree. Likelihood of an internationally recognized Palestinian state Around half of Israelis (51%) say it is somewhat or very unlikely that the international community will recognize an independent Palestinian state within the next five years, while 40% say this is likely.

The electric vehicle market in the U.S. continues to expand, albeit at a slower pace than earlier in the decade. One-third of Americans say they would very or somewhat seriously consider purchasing an electric vehicle (EV) as their next vehicle. This is a slight uptick from last year (4 percentage points), but still down from the 42% of Americans in 2022 who said they would seriously consider purchasing an EV. A larger share of Americans (53%) say they are not too or not at all likely to seriously consider purchasing an EV. And 14% say they do not plan to purchase a vehicle. Democrats remain more likely than Republicans to say they would seriously consider purchasing an EV (48% vs. 18%). Adults younger than 50, including both Democrats and Republicans in this age group, are more likely than older adults to say they would consider purchasing an EV. Those who live in urban and suburban areas are also more likely than those in rural areas to say they would be interested in purchasing an EV. Refer to the Appendix for more. Interest in hybrid vehicles In the face of slowing EV sales in the U.S., some automakers are focusing more on hybrid vehicles. Americans are more interested in purchasing a hybrid vehicle than an electric vehicle: 45% say they are very or somewhat likely to seriously consider purchasing a hybrid the next time they purchase a vehicle. A slightly smaller share (40%) say they are not too or not at all likely to consider purchasing a hybrid vehicle. Refer to the Appendix for more on Americans’ interest in buying a hybrid vehicle. Views on phasing out production of new gasoline vehicles California and 11 other states have adopted plans to ban the sale of new gasoline cars and trucks in 2035, but last month the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate voted to block California from implementing its ban. The state of California is expected to sue over the procedural tactic Senate Republicans used. About one-third of Americans (34%) say they favor phasing out the production of new gasoline cars and trucks by 2035, while about two-thirds (65%) say they oppose it. The share of Americans who favor phasing out new gasoline cars and trucks by 2035 has fallen by 13 points since 2021. This decline has been driven by both Republicans and Democrats. In the new survey, just more than half of Democrats (54%) favor phasing out the production of new gasoline cars and trucks by 2035, down 14 points since 2021. Still, Democrats remain far more likely than Republicans to support phasing out new gasoline cars and trucks. Differences among Democrats on electric vehicles Democrats across the ideological spectrum oppose more fossil fuel use, but there’s less consensus among Democrats when it comes to EVs. Liberal Democrats have different views than moderate and conservative Democrats on EVs. About two-thirds of liberal Democrats and Democratic leaners (68%) favor phasing out the production of new gas-powered vehicles by 2035. A majority of moderate and conservative Democrats (56%) oppose this policy. There is a 25-point gap between liberal Democrats and moderate to conservative Democrats who support phasing out new gas-powered vehicles (68% vs. 43%). Ideological differences among Democrats also come into play when making the personal decision of purchasing a vehicle. Liberal Democrats are more likely than moderate to conservative Democrats to say they would very or somewhat seriously consider purchasing an EV or hybrid. A majority of liberal Democrats (57%) say they are likely to seriously consider purchasing an EV, compared with about four-in-ten moderate and conservative Democrats (41%). source

An oil pumping jack and wind turbines in a field in Nolan, Texas, in April 2025. (Brandon Bell/Getty Images) How we did this Pew Research Center conducted this study to understand Americans’ views on energy issues. For this report, we surveyed 5,085 U.S. adults from April 28 to May 4, 2025. Everyone who took part in the survey is a member of the Center’s American Trends Panel (ATP), a group of people recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses who have agreed to take surveys regularly. This kind of recruitment gives nearly all U.S. adults a chance of selection. Interviews were conducted either online or by telephone with a live interviewer. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the ATP’s methodology. Here are the questions used for this analysis, the topline and the survey methodology. The Trump administration has pursued an energy policy that prioritizes the development of fossil fuels, such as oil, coal and natural gas, over renewable sources like wind and solar. In Washington, Congress is considering speeding up approval of oil and natural gas projects and cutting incentives for low-carbon electricity development. How have Americans’ views on energy changed in recent years? A new Pew Research Center survey of 5,085 U.S. adults conducted from April 28 to May 4, 2025, takes a look. This report builds on our long-standing work tracking how Americans think about energy production in the United States and related issues, including views on electric vehicles. Key highlights While wind and solar power are still popular overall, Americans have become less supportive of these sources since the first Trump administration. This shift has been driven by sharp declines in support among Republicans and Republican leaners. Nuclear power has seen an increase in support in recent years, with more positive views among Republicans and Democrats alike. Phasing out the production of new gasoline cars and trucks by 2035 is unpopular with Americans. A majority oppose this proposal, and opposition has become more widespread since 2021 (among both Republicans and Democrats). Americans are more likely to say they would seriously consider buying a hybrid vehicle (45%) than an electric vehicle (33%). Democrats remain more likely than Republicans to say that next time they purchase a vehicle, they would be interested in buying a hybrid or electric model. Shifting support for renewable energy since the first Trump administration In the new survey, 68% of Americans favor more wind power, compared with 83% in 2020 at the end of the first Trump administration. Similarly, 77% of Americans favor more solar power, down from nine-in-ten in 2020. Using more of these renewable energy sources still remains popular with Americans – more so than carbon-intensive options like hydraulic fracturing and coal mining – but there’s been a clear trend in waning support nonetheless. While less popular than renewable options, forms of fossil fuel development receive somewhat greater support today than five years ago.   Decline in support for renewables among Republicans since first Trump administration In 2020, and in other Center surveys during the first Trump administration, wind and solar were the most popular forms of energy development among Republicans. For example, in 2020, 84% of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents supported more solar power and 75% favored more wind power. Smaller shares favored more offshore oil and gas drilling (63%), hydraulic fracturing for oil and natural gas (56%), coal mining (54%) and nuclear power (53%). In the new survey, wind and solar are much less popular among Republicans than they were, reflecting declines that have occurred over the last five years. About six-in-ten favor more solar power (61%), and about half favor more wind power (48%). There’s now greater GOP support for expanding offshore oil and gas drilling (75%), hydraulic fracturing (69%), nuclear power (69%) and coal mining (67%). Should the country prioritize renewable or fossil fuel energy? When asked whether the country should prioritize developing renewable sources or fossil fuel sources, six-in-ten Americans say the country should prioritize renewables like wind and solar. While this remains the majority opinion, the share who prioritize renewable sources is down significantly from a high 0f 79% in the spring of 2020.   Republicans’ views on the nation’s energy priorities are now the reverse of what they were in 2020. Today, 67% of Republicans and Republican leaners say the country should give priority to developing fossil fuel sources like oil, coal and natural gas. In 2020, 65% of Republicans said renewable energy development should be the country’s bigger priority. Younger Republicans still prioritize renewable energy more than older Republicans, but their support has dropped since last year Younger Republicans remain more supportive of solar and wind power than their older counterparts – but their support for renewable energy has declined in the last year. For example, 51% of Republicans ages 18 to 29 say the country should prioritize renewable energy, a decrease of 16 percentage points from last year. Refer to the Appendix for more. Overwhelming majorities of Democrats continue to back wind and solar power. In the new survey, 91% of Democrats and Democratic leaners say they favor more solar power and 87% support more wind power. Democratic support for renewables has been steadfast in recent years, and these shares are nearly identical to those seen during the first Trump administration. Consistent with these views, a large 86% majority think the country should prioritize renewable energy development over fossil fuel development. Increased support for nuclear power Some are pointing to more nuclear power as one way for the U.S. to meet rising demand for electricity. Americans have become much more favorable toward more nuclear power plants in recent years. About six-in-ten (59%) now back more nuclear power plants to generate electricity. As recently as 2020, there was greater opposition than support for more nuclear power. The increase in support for nuclear power has occurred among both Democrats and Republicans. Jump to: Views on

The Trump administration has taken a number of actions to promote the development and use of fossil fuels and reduce support for renewable energy. This includes a push to increase drilling for oil and natural gas on federal lands and an executive order pausing approvals and permits for wind energy projects, including offshore wind. Where do Americans stand on these issues? When asked about drilling for oil and natural gas on federal land, 33% of Americans say it should be increased and 28% say it should be decreased. The remainder say the amount of oil and natural drilling should be kept the same as it is now (19%) or are not sure (20%). Democrats and Republicans have divergent views on this question, reflecting broader differences on fossil fuel production and use. A majority of Republicans (57%) say drilling for oil and natural gas on federal land should be increased, while only 9% say it should be decreased. In contrast, almost half of Democrats say oil and natural gas drilling should be decreased and about one-in-ten say it should be increased. Younger Republicans are far less likely than older Republicans to say oil and natural gas drilling should be increased on federal land. Roughly one-third of Republicans ages 18 to 29 (34%) say drilling for oil and natural gas on federally owned land should be increased, compared with 70% of Republicans 50 and older. A smaller share of Republicans 18 to 29 (15%) think drilling for oil and natural gas on federal land should be decreased. The survey asked roughly half of respondents whether they favor or oppose more offshore wind turbine farms (the other half of respondents were asked about their views on “wind turbine farms,” which is regularly included in our surveys on energy). About seven-in-ten favor more offshore wind farms (69%), while three-in-ten oppose this. More than eight-in-ten Democrats (84%) favor more offshore wind power, while about half of Republicans do (52%). Views on environmental regulations In March, the Environmental Protection Agency announced that it would scale back many environmental regulations, including rules and policies that regulate emissions from cars and trucks. Slightly more than half (54%) of Americans say it is possible to cut back on environmental regulations and still protect air and water quality in the U.S., while 45% say it’s not possible. Republicans and Democrats have opposite positions on this question: 77% of Republicans say it is possible to cut back on environmental regulations and still protect air and water quality, and 67% of Democrats say it is not possible. source

To better understand how LGBTQ adults identify, we asked respondents three separate questions: If they are gay or lesbian, bisexual, straight or something else If they are transgender If they think of themselves as queer When it comes to sexual orientation, more than half of LGBTQ adults (55%) describe themselves as bisexual. Four-in-ten are gay or lesbian, while small shares are straight (1%) or something else (3%). About one-in-ten LGBTQ adults (9%) are transgender. This includes 4% who are nonbinary, 3% who are men, 1% who are women and 1% who describe their gender in some other way. About half of all LGBTQ adults (48%) think of themselves as queer, while 44% do not (8% are not sure). Younger LGBTQ adults are particularly likely to identify as queer: 59% of those ages 18 to 29 think of themselves this way, compared with about half of those in their 30s and fewer than half in older age groups.  Answers to these questions reveal that LGBTQ identities often overlap. For example, 80% of transgender adults are gay, lesbian or bisexual. And 82% of trans adults also think of themselves as queer. For the remainder of this chapter, references to gay, lesbian and bisexual adults exclude those who are transgender. Transgender adults are of any sexual orientation. Queer adults are included in the total and in the gay or lesbian, bisexual, and trans totals if they indicated they also identify with these terms. The number of queer respondents who do not identify as gay or lesbian, bisexual, or trans is too small to analyze separately. Importance of being LGBTQ to overall identity About four-in-ten LGBTQ adults (42%) say being gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender or queer is extremely or very important to who they are as a person. But there are differences across groups. Two-thirds of trans adults say being transgender is highly important to who they are. A narrower majority of gay and lesbian adults (54%) say the same about being gay or lesbian. Fewer than half of bisexual adults (29%) see being bisexual as highly important to who they are. The shares saying their LGBTQ identity is extremely or very important to them do not vary considerably by age, income or education. But there are some differences by race and ethnicity. Some 48% of Black LGBTQ adults and 47% of Hispanic LGBTQ adults say this part of their identity is highly important to who they are, compared with 39% of White LGBTQ adults. (The number of Asian LGBTQ adults in the sample is too small to analyze separately.) There are also wide gaps by party: 46% of LGBTQ Democrats and Democratic leaners say this part of their identity is extremely or very important, compared with 25% of LGBTQ Republicans and Republican leaners. Half of Republicans – versus 23% of Democrats – say it’s not too or not at all important. Gender expression among LGBTQ adults Scholars have explored gender expression among LGBTQ adults in terms of how they describe their own masculinity and femininity, as well as how they think others perceive them. We asked LGBTQ adults to rate themselves on two scales: A masculinity scale from 0 to 4, where 4 means extremely masculine and 0 means not at all masculine. A femininity scale from 0 to 4, where 4 means extremely feminine and 0 means not at all feminine. We then subtracted ratings on the femininity scale from ratings on the masculinity scale to come up with an overall rating for each respondent. For example, if someone rated themselves a 4 on the masculinity scale and a 1 on the femininity scale, their overall rating would be 3. We combined the overall ratings into the following categories: Highly masculine (4, 3) Lean masculine (2, 1) Equally masculine and feminine or neither masculine nor feminine (0) Lean feminine (-1, -2) Highly feminine (-3, -4) We also asked these questions in a September 2024 survey of all U.S. adults focused on society’s views of men and masculinity. Overall, 19% of LGBTQ men see themselves as highly masculine; 54% say they lean masculine, 20% say they are neither or both equally, and 7% say they lean feminine or are highly feminine. Among LGBTQ women, 19% say they are highly feminine, and 47% say they lean feminine. About one-in-five (22%) say they are neither or both equally, and 12% lean masculine or are highly masculine. About four-in-ten nonbinary LGBTQ adults (39%) say that they are equally masculine and feminine or that they are neither. Similar shares place themselves on the masculine (31%) and feminine (30%) sides of the scale. In the fall 2024 survey, 42% of all U.S. men rated themselves as highly masculine, while 35% of women saw themselves as highly feminine. (Because the number of nonbinary adults in the general public survey is too small to analyze, the question was only asked of men and women.) Gay and bisexual men give themselves similar ratings on the scale. But among women, those who are bisexual are more likely than those who are gay or lesbian to see themselves as feminine. 71% of bisexual women see themselves as feminine, including 19% who rate themselves as highly feminine. 53% of gay or lesbian women see themselves as feminine, including 20% who rate themselves as highly feminine. About a quarter of gay or lesbian women (23%) say they are highly masculine or lean masculine, compared with 8% of bisexual women. There aren’t enough trans men and trans women in the sample to analyze separately. Views by age As is the case among U.S. men overall, younger LGBTQ men are less likely than older ones to see themselves as highly masculine. Some 12% of LGBTQ men younger than 50 rate themselves this way, compared with 30% of those ages 50 and older. There are no differences by age in where LGBTQ women place themselves on the scale. Views by party Republican LGBTQ men are more likely than their Democratic counterparts to rate themselves as highly masculine

We asked LGBTQ adults whether they feel accepted by their family, friends and co-workers, and about their experiences with discrimination based on their LGBTQ identity. How we defined LGBTQ groups for analysis Throughout this report, references to gay, lesbian and bisexual adults exclude those who are transgender. Transgender adults are of any sexual orientation (28% of trans adults we surveyed identify as gay or lesbian, 53% are bisexual, and 8% are straight). Queer adults are included in the total and in the gay or lesbian, bisexual, and trans totals if they indicated they also identify with these terms. The number of queer respondents who do not identify as gay or lesbian, bisexual or trans is too small to analyze separately. Read Chapter 4 for more detail on the questions we asked related to sexual orientation and gender identity. Some LGBTQ adults are not out to different people in their lives. Varying shares say no one in each of the following groups knows about their sexual orientation or gender identity: Their extended family (32%) Their co-workers (25% among those with co-workers) Their parents or the people who raised them (23%) Their siblings (18% among those with siblings) Their friends (5%) Bisexual adults are more likely than others to say no one in these groups knows about their identity. For example, 47% of bisexual adults say no one in their extended family knows, compared with 26% of transgender adults and 13% of gay or lesbian adults. Acceptance by family, friends and co-workers Parents Figures for parents exclude those who say none of their parents or the people who raised them know about their identity. Fewer than half of LGBTQ adults who are out to their parents or the people who raised them (46%) say they are all accepting. Another 42% say some have been accepting, while 12% say none of them have been accepting. Gay or lesbian adults are the most likely – and transgender adults the least likely – to say all of their parents or the people who raised them are accepting. About half of gay or lesbian adults (52%) say this is the case, compared with 44% of bisexual adults and 31% of transgender adults. Siblings Figures for siblings exclude those who don’t have siblings and those who say none of their siblings know about their identity. Most LGBTQ adults (69%) say all of their siblings have been accepting of them. Again, gay or lesbian adults stand out as the most likely to say all of their siblings have been accepting (74% vs. 65% of bisexual adults and 58% of transgender adults). Extended family Figures for extended family exclude those who say none of their extended family know about their identity. Levels of acceptance drop for extended family such as grandparents, aunts and cousins: 56% of LGBTQ adults say all or most of their extended family has been accepting of them, including 27% who say all have been. Acceptance by extended family varies widely across groups: Gay or lesbian adults: 69% say all or most have been accepting, with 33% saying all have been. Bisexual adults: 45% say all or most, with 23% saying all. Transgender adults: 35% say all or most, with 11% saying all. Friends and co-workers Figures for friends exclude those who say none of their friends know about their identity. Figures for co-workers exclude those who don’t have co-workers and those who say none of their co-workers know about their identity. Majorities of LGBTQ adults say all or most of their friends and co-workers have been accepting. Most (84%) say all or most of their friends have been accepting, including 61% who say all have been. While majorities across LGBTQ groups say all or most of their friends have been accepting, gay or lesbian adults are the most likely to say this (92% vs. 81% of transgender and 78% of bisexual adults). Experiences vary more widely when it comes to co-workers. About three-quarters of employed LGBTQ adults (74%) say all or most of their co-workers have been accepting. Again, larger shares of gay or lesbian adults (85%) say this than bisexual (65%) and transgender adults (61%). While majorities across groups say all or most of their co-workers have been accepting, there are stark differences in the shares saying all have been accepting: Gay or lesbian adults: 50% Bisexual adults: 45% Transgender adults: 24% Experiences with discrimination The survey also asked respondents if they have faced certain forms of discrimination because they are – or were perceived to be – gay, lesbian, bisexual or transgender. More than half of LGBTQ adults (59%) say they have been subject to slurs and jokes, with 20% saying they experienced this in the 12 months prior to the survey. Roughly four in-ten (41%) say they have feared for their personal safety at some point because of their LGBTQ identity. And about one-in-five or more say they have: Received poor service at restaurants, hotels or other places of business (24%) Been treated poorly by doctors, nurses or other health care professionals (21%) Been treated unfairly by an employer in hiring, pay or promotion (19%). Gay or lesbian and transgender adults are more likely than bisexual adults to say they have faced each of these experiences. For example, majorities of gay or lesbian adults (73%) and transgender adults (68%) say they have been subject to slurs or jokes, compared with 47% of bisexual adults. Transgender adults are more likely than others to say they have feared for their personal safety and have been treated poorly by health care professionals. And they are especially likely to say that each of the following has happened to them in the 12 months prior to the survey: Been subject to slurs or jokes (42% vs. 22% of gay or lesbian and 16% of bisexual adults) Feared for their personal safety (44% vs. 12% and 8%) Been treated poorly by health care professionals (20% vs. 5% and 4%) Been treated unfairly by an employer (11% vs.

Israelis perceive several obstacles to lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Seven-in-ten or more say lack of trust between Israelis and Palestinians and the status of Jerusalem are major obstacles to peace. Smaller shares say the same about Israeli settlements in the West Bank (52%), conflict between the Israeli left and right (43%), and conflict between Hamas and Fatah (34%). Jews and Arabs in Israel differ in what they consider major obstacles. For example, 82% of Jews say lack of trust between Israelis and Palestinians is a major obstacle, compared with 44% of Arabs. And there is no consensus among the Israeli public as to whether Jewish settlements in the West Bank help (44%) or hurt (35%) security in Israel. Roughly half of Jewish Israelis (53%) say the settlements help the security of their country, compared with 9% of Arab Israelis. The share of the Israeli public – and Israeli Jews in particular – saying settlements help Israel’s security has grown since we first asked the question in 2013. What are the obstacles to peace? Most Israelis see lack of trust between Israelis and Palestinians as an obstacle to peace between the two groups, with three-quarters describing it as a major obstacle. Seven-in-ten Israelis say the status of Jerusalem – a city that both Israelis and Palestinians claim as their capital – is a major obstacle. About half of Israelis say the settlements in the West Bank are a major obstacle to peace (52%), while a quarter say they are not an obstacle at all. Fewer see conflict between the left and right in Israel as a major obstacle to peace: 43% describe it as such, with another 24% describing it as a minor obstacle and 28% saying it is not an obstacle. Around a third of Israelis (34%) say conflict between Hamas and Fatah is a major obstacle to peace. Views by ethnicity Most Israeli Arabs (86%) say Israeli settlements in the West Bank are a major obstacle to lasting peace, while 43% of Israeli Jews say the same. Views are nearly reversed when it comes to lack of trust between Israelis and Palestinians. Most Israeli Jews (82%) say this is a major obstacle, compared with 44% of Israeli Arabs. Majorities in both ethnic groups see the status of Jerusalem as a major obstacle to peace, though Israeli Arabs are more likely to say this than Israeli Jews (88% vs. 66%). Arabs are also more likely than Jews to call conflict between Hamas and Fatah a major obstacle (46% vs. 32%). Notably, 18% of Jews say they are not sure about the conflict between Hamas and Fatah. Similar shares of Israeli Jews (44%) and Israeli Arabs (39%) say conflict between the political left and right in Israel is a major obstacle to lasting peace. Views by Jewish religiousness Among Jewish religious groups, roughly equal shares say political conflict on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides are major obstacles to peace. But there is less agreement on West Bank settlements and the status of Jerusalem. Around half of Hilonim (56%) say Israeli settlements are a major obstacle to peace, compared with 35% of Masortim and 35% of Haredim and Datiim. And on the question of Jerusalem, at least seven-in-ten Hilonim (72%) and Haredim and Datiim (70%) say the city’s status is a major obstacle to peace. Masortim are less likely to express this view (52%). Large majorities across these Jewish religious groups say lack of trust between Israelis and Palestinians is a major obstacle to peace, but Haredim and Datiim (76%) are slightly less likely to think so than Masortim (88%) or Hilonim (84%). Views by ideology Israelis on the ideological left are more likely than those on the right to see several issues as major obstacles to lasting peace, including settlements, the status of Jerusalem, and conflicts in Israeli and Palestinian politics. The only exception is lack of trust between Israelis and Palestinians – 65% of Israelis on the left say this is a major obstacle, compared with 78% of those in the center and 81% of those on the right. Do settlements in the West Bank help or hurt Israel’s security? Many in Israel see West Bank settlements as an obstacle to peace, but the public is more divided on their role in national security: 44% say the continued building of settlements in the West Bank helps Israel’s security, 35% say it hurts security, and 16% say it does not make a difference. The share of Israelis who say settlements help Israel’s security is not significantly different from what it was last year. But it has grown considerably from 27% in 2013, when the question was first asked. This shift is mostly led by Israeli Jews. About half of Jews (53%) say settlements help Israel’s security, up 22 points from 31% in 2013. The share of Israeli Arabs who agree has remained under 10% over this period. Views by ethnicity Jewish Israelis are much more likely than Arab Israelis to view settlements as helpful to their country’s security (53% vs. 9%). Nearly seven-in-ten Israeli Arabs say the settlements hurt Israel’s security – a position also taken by 26% of Israeli Jews. Views by Jewish religiousness Hilonim are much less likely than members of other Jewish groups to say the continued building of Jewish settlements in the West Bank helps Israel’s security. While 78% of Haredim and Datiim and 62% of Masortim say settlements help security, far fewer Hilonim (27%) take this position. Views by ideology and perceptions of obstacles to peace Israelis on the ideological right are particularly likely to say West Bank settlements help security (72%). Around one-in-five of those in the center (18%) and 10% of those on the left share this viewpoint. Among those on the left, around three-quarters (77%) say settlements hurt the security of Israel. Israelis who say West Bank settlements are a major obstacle to peace are much more likely than Israelis who believe otherwise to say the settlements hurt Israel’s security. source

Two neighbors transport belongings in a canoe as the Kentucky River begins to flood their homes in Frankfort on April 6, 2025. (Michael Swensen/Getty Images) How we did this Pew Research Center conducted this study to understand Americans’ attitudes toward and experiences with extreme weather. For this analysis, we surveyed 5,085 U.S. adults from April 28 to May 4, 2025. Everyone who took part in the survey is a member of the Center’s American Trends Panel (ATP), a group of people recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses who have agreed to take surveys regularly. This kind of recruitment gives nearly all U.S. adults a chance of selection. Interviews were conducted either online or by telephone with a live interviewer. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the ATP’s methodology. Here are the questions used for this report, the topline and the survey methodology. As weather and climate disasters costing over $1 billion in damages become regular occurrences in the United States, a new Pew Research Center survey finds that 77% of Americans say stricter building standards are a good idea for communities at high risk of extreme weather. These findings come amid conversations about scaling back the role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in setting standards and working with states to handle disaster response. The survey also finds that 64% of Americans think it is a good idea for government to provide financial assistance for people in high-risk communities to rebuild in the wake of extreme weather events, illustrating the multiple considerations Americans bring to conversations about how the country should deal with the growing impacts of extreme weather. The survey conducted from April 28 to May 4, 2025, among 5,085 U.S. adults explores attitudes about the steps government could take to address extreme weather impacts, as well as the link Americans see between extreme weather and climate change. The report builds on long-standing efforts at the Center to understand how Americans think about the interrelated issues of energy, climate and extreme weather. Key highlights: Americans have mixed views on government helping homeowners cover the rising cost of insurance: 41% say this is a good idea, while 34% call it a bad idea. Americans express some openness to banning new construction in areas at high risk of extreme weather (39% say good idea vs. 28% say bad idea). But few support requiring people to move out of high-risk areas (only 14% say this is a good idea). On this and other policy steps, many Americans say they are not sure, underscoring the developing nature of public views on this issue. Most Americans who have experienced extreme weather in the last year say climate change played a role. Across each of the five types of extreme weather events we asked about (like intense storms or floods), at least eight-in-ten who experienced the event say climate change contributed a lot or a little. Partisanship shapes perceptions of extreme weather itself, as well as the connection to climate change. Republicans are less likely to report extreme weather events than Democrats. And while most Republicans who do report experiencing extreme weather events draw a link to climate change, they are much less likely than Democrats to see a strong connection. Views among Republicans and Democrats on extreme weather policies On actions government could take around extreme weather, there are notable areas of common ground between Republicans and Democrats. Amid recent debates over the impacts of stricter building codes, large shares of both Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents (84%) as well as Republicans and Republican leaners (71%) say it is a good idea for government to set stricter building standards for new construction in communities at high risk of extreme weather. Similarly, majorities of both groups also think it’s a good idea for government to provide financial assistance for people in high-risk areas to rebuild after extreme weather impacts. Differences emerge on other potential steps. On balance, more Republicans say it is a bad idea than a good idea for government to help people with the rising cost of homeowners insurance (44% vs. 32%). By contrast, larger shares of Democrats view this as a good idea than a bad one (50% vs. 24%). Among both groups, about a quarter say they are not sure. Debates about how to handle rising premiums are taking place around the country, including in California in the wake of devastating wildfires. When it comes to the idea of government banning new construction in high-risk areas, Republicans are split: 34% say this is a good idea, while 38% say it is a bad idea. Democrats are more open to this approach (44% say good idea vs. 19% say bad idea). Both Republicans and Democrats express far more negative than positive sentiment when it comes to the idea of government requiring people to move out of areas at high risk of extreme weather. Views on these six potential government actions among the general public – and partisan groups – are largely similar to those measured in a 2024 Center survey. Still, support for government providing financial assistance for people to rebuild has increased 10 percentage points among Republicans and 5 points among Democrats since last year. Extreme weather and its link to climate change Climate scientists have found that climate change is driving an increase in extreme weather, as documented in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report. Overall, 74% of Americans say they’ve experienced at least one of five forms of extreme weather in the past 12 months. Among those reporting any of these experiences, majorities view climate change as a contributor to the extreme weather. For instance, among the roughly half of Americans who say they have experienced long periods of unusually hot weather in the last year, 91% say climate change contributed either a lot (64%) or a little (27%) to this. Large majorities who have experienced