Pew Research Center

In our 36-country survey, we asked respondents how large a problem various types of inequality are in their nation, including the gap between the rich and the poor, unequal rights for men and women, discrimination based on a person’s race or ethnicity, and discrimination based on a person’s religion. Here are some key takeaways: A median of 54% across the countries surveyed say the gap between the rich and the poor is a very big problem. Smaller median shares say the same about the other types of inequality. In general, people in middle-income countries are more likely than those in high-income countries to see each form of inequality as a very big problem where they live. In some countries, people on the ideological left are especially likely to see economic inequality, gender inequality, and racial and ethnic discrimination as very big problems when compared with those on the right. The gap between the rich and the poor A majority in every country surveyed says the gap between rich and poor is at least a moderately big problem. However, the median share who see economic inequality as a very big problem is higher in middle-income countries than in high-income ones (62% vs. 48%). (Read Appendix A for a classification of middle- and high-income nations.) Argentina, Kenya and South Africa are among the countries where people are most likely to say economic inequality is a very big problem: Seven-in-ten or more hold this view in each. By contrast, three-in-ten or fewer say the same in Poland, Singapore and Sweden. Few people in each survey country say the gap between rich and poor is not a problem at all where they live. Views by ideology In about half of the countries surveyed, people on the ideological left are more likely than those on the right to say the gap between the rich and the poor is a very big problem. The largest ideological gap is in the U.S., where 76% of liberals hold this view, compared with 30% on the right – a 46-point difference. There are also large left-right gaps on this question in Australia (40 points) and South Korea (35 points). Views by income In 12 countries, people with lower annual incomes express greater concern about economic inequality than those with higher incomes. For example, 47% of Israelis who earn the national median annual income or less say economic inequality is a very big problem in their country, compared with 28% of those who earn more than the national median income. Racial or ethnic discrimination Across the countries surveyed, a median of 34% of adults say racial or ethnic discrimination is a very big problem where they live. Another 34% consider it a moderately big problem. Concerns are especially high in the sub-Saharan African and Latin American countries surveyed, as well as in Turkey and in the Asia-Pacific nations of Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka. Roughly four-in-ten or more in France, Germany, Italy and Spain also say this is a very big problem. But fewer than two-in-ten in Australia, Singapore, South Korea and Sweden – and only around one-in-ten in Poland – feel the same. (For this question, respondents in most countries were asked about discrimination based on “race or ethnicity.” In Hungary, Indonesia, Sweden, Tunisia and Turkey, the question used “ethnicity.” In India, the question used “caste or ethnicity.” In Kenya, the question used “ethnicity or tribe.”) Views by ideology In about half the countries surveyed, people on the ideological left are more likely than those on the right to say racial or ethnic discrimination is a very big problem in their country. The largest ideological gap is in the U.S., where 51% of liberals say this type of discrimination is a very big problem, compared with 33% of moderates and 15% of conservatives. However, there are also left-right differences exceeding 20 points in France, Germany and Israel. Views by ethnicity In Israel, Arab adults are about four times as likely as Jewish adults to say that racial or ethnic discrimination is a very big problem in their country (63% vs. 15%). And in Brazil, Black and mixed-race adults (49% and 45%) are more likely than White adults (36%) to hold this view. In the U.S., roughly two-thirds of Black Americans (64%) say racial or ethnic discrimination is a very big problem, a much higher share than Hispanic Americans (36%), Asian Americans (35%), and White Americans (23%). Gender inequality Across the 36 countries, a median of 31% of adults say unequal rights for men and women is a verybigproblem in their country. Another 31% say it is a moderately big problem. People in some middle-income countries are particularly likely to view gender inequality as a very big problem. In Latin America, for example, six-in-ten Colombians consider it a very big problem, as do roughly half of Peruvians. In sub-Saharan Africa, about half of Kenyans and South Africans hold this view, too. Of the high-income nations surveyed, people in France, Spain and Italy express the highest levels of concern about gender inequality. On the other hand, only about one-in-ten adults in the high-income nations of Singapore and Sweden see unequal rights for men and women as a very big problem where they live. Views by gender In half the countries surveyed, women are more likely than men to say gender inequality is a very big problem. For example, 34% of women in Greece hold this opinion, compared with 17% of men. There are also large gender gaps on this question in Italy, Peru and Colombia. Views by ideology In about a third of the countries surveyed, people on the ideological left are more likely than those on the right to see unequal rights for men and women as a very big problem. For instance, 38% of Israelis on the left say this, compared with 23% in the center and 8% on the right. Ideological gaps also exceed 20 points in Brazil, Poland, Spain, Turkey and the U.S. Religious discrimination Overall,

For this analysis, we grouped people into two political categories: those who support the governing political party (or parties) in their country, and those who do not. These categories were coded based on the party or parties in power at the time the survey was fielded and on respondents’ answers to a question asking which political party, if any, they identify with in their country. In countries where multiple political parties govern in coalition (as is the case in many European countries), survey respondents who indicate support for any party in the coalition were grouped together. In Germany, for example, where the Social Democratic Party governed with Alliance 90/The Greens and the Free Democratic Party at the time of the spring 2024 survey, supporters of any of the three parties were grouped together. In countries where different political parties control the executive and legislative branches of government, the party holding the executive branch was considered the governing party. Survey respondents who did not indicate support for any political party, or who refused to identify with one, were categorized as not supporting the government in power. Party identification was not asked about in the Philippines or Tunisia. The table below outlines the governing political parties in each survey country.  source

Molti sostengono che l’influenza politica dei ricchi sia un fattore determinante Questo comunicato stampa è stato tradotto in italiano dall’inglese, lingua originale di redazione. Un nuovo sondaggio del Pew Research Center condotto in 36 Paesi, pubblicato oggi, rileva una diffusa preoccupazione dell’opinione pubblica in relazione alle disuguaglianze economiche. Alla domanda relativa a cosa conduca a queste disuguaglianze, la maggior parte delle persone nei Paesi oggetto del sondaggio indica l’intersezione tra ricchezza e politica. Una mediana del 54% degli adulti dei Paesi esaminati afferma che il divario tra ricchi e poveri è un problema molto grande nel proprio Paese; una mediana del 30% afferma invece che è un problema moderatamente grande. Una mediana del 60% ritiene che l’eccessiva influenza politica dei ricchi contribuisca in larga misura a generare diseguaglianze economiche. Tra i sei fattori presi in esame, questo è quello che trova maggiormente il riscontro degli intervistati, posizionandosi in cima alla lista in 31 dei 36 Paesi in cui è stato svolto sondaggio. Il nostro sondaggio ha anche riscontrato un’ansia profonda a livello mondiale in merito al futuro dell’economia e un forte desiderio per una riforma economica. Una mediana del 57% degli adulti intervistati prevede che i bambini del proprio Paese, una volta cresciuti, staranno peggio dei loro genitori dal punto di vista economico, mentre una mediana del 34% sostiene che staranno meglio. In 15 dei 31 Paesi per cui sono disponibili le tendenze, la percentuale di pubblico che pensa che i figli staranno peggio dei loro genitori dal punto di vista economico è più alta oggi rispetto ai sondaggi precedenti alla pandemia. Nei Paesi in cui è stato condotto il sondaggio si registra un ampio sostegno alla modifica del sistema economico. In tutti i Paesi tranne tre (Singapore, Paesi Bassi e Svezia), la maggioranza delle persone afferma che il loro sistema economico necessita di cambiamenti profondi (mediana del 52%) o di una riforma completa (mediana del 20%). Dei Paesi europei oggetto del sondaggio, gli adulti italiani sono i più propensi ad affermare che la presenza di alcune persone che lavorano più duramente di altre, unita alla presenza di alcune persone che nascono con maggiori opportunità, contribuisca in larga misura alle disuguaglianze economiche nel Paese. La maggioranza afferma che questo è il caso in ogni misura. Circa otto italiani su dieci (79%) ritengono inoltre che i bambini di oggi vivranno una situazione economicamente peggiore di quella dei loro genitori in futuro. Risultati chiave aggiuntivi del report: Fattori che si ritiene contribuiscano alle diseguaglianze economiche La maggioranza delle persone in quasi tutti i Paesi oggetto del sondaggio ritiene che tutti i sei fattori esaminati siano causa di diseguaglianze economiche almeno in parte. Tuttavia, esistono delle differenze in merito al fatto che ciascuno di essi vi contribuisca in misura notevole. Una mediana del 48% degli adulti sostiene che i problemi nel sistema educativo del proprio Paese contribuiscono in larga misura alle diseguaglianze economiche. Di tutti i Paesi presi in esame, lo Sri Lanka e la Turchia sono gli unici due Paesi in cui ciò viene considerato il maggiore fattore determinante. Circa quattro intervistati su dieci hanno affermato che la presenza di alcune persone nate con maggiori opportunità di altri (40%) e la presenza di alcune persone che lavorano più duramente di altre (39%) sono fattori che contribuiscono alle diseguaglianze economiche in larga misura. Un numero minore indica l’impatto dei robot e dei computer che svolgono il lavoro precedentemente svolto dagli esseri umani (31%) o le discriminazioni delle minoranze razziali o etniche (29%). I Brasiliani sono maggiormente propensi a ritenere che le discriminazioni razziali o etniche siano uno dei principali fattori che determinano le diseguaglianze economiche: lo afferma il 64%, la percentuale più alta in tutti i Paesi oggetto del sondaggio. Percezioni delle diseguaglianze e delle discriminazioni a livello globale Nel nostro sondaggio abbiamo chiesto agli intervistati la portata dei problemi di vari tipi di disuguaglianze nel loro Paese, tra cui il divario tra ricchi e poveri (una mediana del 54% lo considera un problema molto grave), le discriminazioni basate sulla razza o l’etnia di una persona (34%), la disparità di diritti tra uomini e donne (31%) e le discriminazioni basate sulla religione di una persona (29%). Molti degli intervistati nei Paesi oggetto del sondaggio li considerano problemi moderatamente gravi. Molte persone li considerano dei problemi molto gravi nel proprio Paese. In 35 Paesi su 36, la maggior parte degli intervistati afferma ciò in merito al divario tra ricchi e poveri rispetto a qualsiasi altro problema. Nel complesso, vi è meno preoccupazione circa le discriminazioni religiose rispetto agli altri problemi esaminati. Tuttavia, in cinque Paesi (Bangladesh, Francia, India, Nigeria e Sri Lanka), la metà o più delle persone intervistate ritiene che le discriminazioni religiose siano un problema molto grave. Le persone provenienti da Paesia reddito medio sono più propense a considerare tutte le forme di diseguaglianza come un problema grave rispetto alle persone dei Paesi ad alto reddito. (Consulti l’Appendice A per una classificazione dei Paesi a medio reddito e ad alto reddito.) Di seguito sono riportati i risultati chiave di un nuovo sondaggio del Pew Research Center che si è svolto tra il 5 di gennaio e il 22 maggio 2024 e ha coinvolto 45.103 adulti. Leggere il report completo (in inglese): https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2025/01/09/economic-inequality-seen-as-major-challenge-around-the-world/ LEGGERE ANCHE: Le valutazioni economiche in 34 Paesi sono più negative che positive Metodologia: https://www.pewresearch.org/2025/01/09/methodology-inequality/ Risultati principali del sondaggio: https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/20/2025/01/pg_2025.01.09_inequality_topline.pdf source

For this report, we grouped countries into high-income and middle-income categories based on definitions from the World Bank. source

In most of the countries we surveyed, there is widespread support for changing the economic system. In fact, in all but three nations, majorities say the economic system in their country needs major changes or complete reform. Across all 36 countries, a median of 20% of adults say their economic system needs to be completely reformed, while a median of 52% call for major changes. Much smaller median shares say their economic system needs minor changes (16%) or no changes at all (3%). Significant shares in some middle-income countries support complete economic reform. Majorities in Nigeria and Tunisia say this is necessary, and roughly four-in-ten or more agree in Ghana, India, Malaysia, South Africa and Turkey. Only in the Netherlands, Singapore and Sweden – all high-income countries – do fewer than half of adults want significant economic changes. Majorities in most North American and European countries surveyed say their system needs at least major changes, including three-quarters or more in France, Greece, Hungary, Italy and Spain. And across both regions, no more than about a quarter of adults think their economic system needs complete reform in any survey country. Views by perception of economic inequality In nearly all countries surveyed, adults who see economic inequality as a very big problem are significantly more likely than others to favor significant changes to the economic system. For example, Swedish adults who think inequality is a very big problem are twice as likely as those who think it’s a moderately big problem, a small problem or not a problem at all to say Sweden’s economic system needs major changes or complete reform. And in 31 of the 36 countries surveyed, people who say the current economic situation in their country is bad are more likely than those who say it’s good to favor significant changes. Views by age In 10 countries, younger adults are more likely than older people to favor significant economic changes. These include the U.S., where 77% of adults under 35 want major changes or complete reform to the economic system, compared with 58% of people ages 50 and older. Views by gender In seven countries, larger shares of women than men say their economic system needs at least major changes. In France, for example, 81% of women support major economic changes or complete reform, compared with 72% of men. How support for economic reform has changed over time Opinions about economic reform have changed since we last asked this question in several places. In 10 countries, significantly greater shares of adults favor major economic change or complete reform this year than in the past. In fact, this share has doubled in Australia since 2021 – from 32% then to 64% today. Support for large-scale economic change is also up in several European countries compared with three years ago. Smaller shares say their economic system needs major changes or complete reform now than in the past in Argentina (-5 points since 2023), South Korea (-6 since 2021), Spain (-8 since 2021) and Singapore (-13 since 2021). Trend data on this question is not available in Bangladesh, Chile, Colombia, Ghana, Malaysia, Peru, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia or Turkey. source

The religious composition of the 119th Congress Members of the incoming 119th Congress will be sworn in at the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 3, 2025. (Cynthia Johnson/Getty Images) Every two years, Pew Research Center publishes a report on the religious affiliation of members of the incoming Congress. This report is the ninth in the series, which started with the 111th Congress that began in 2009. Data on members of Congress comes from CQ Roll Call, which surveys members about their demographic characteristics, including religious affiliation. Pew Research Center researchers then code the data so that Congress can be compared with U.S. adults overall. For example, members of Congress who tell CQ Roll Call they are “Southern Baptists” are coded as “Baptists” – a broader category (including Southern Baptists as well as other Baptists) used for analysis of the general public.  Data in this report covers voting members of Congress scheduled to be sworn in on Jan. 3, 2025. While there are 535 voting seats in Congress (100 in the Senate and 435 in the House of Representatives), this analysis excludes three of those seats: Florida’s 1st District seat, due to the resignation of Matt Gaetz; Florida’s 6th District seat, due to the announced resignation of Michael Waltz; and the Ohio Senate seat held by JD Vance, who is set to become vice president on Jan. 20, 2025. This analysis, then, looks at 532 members of Congress rather than 535. Data for all U.S. adults comes from Pew Research Center’s 2023 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS), conducted May 19-Sept. 5, 2023. Figures for Protestant subgroups, Messianic Jews, Unitarians and Humanists come from the Center’s American Trends Panel (ATP) survey conducted Aug. 7-27, 2023. Jewish estimates come from the Center’s survey of Jewish Americans, conducted Nov. 19, 2019-June 3, 2020. Read more about how Pew Research Center measures the religious composition of the United States. When the U.S. Congress convenes for its 119th session on Jan. 3, it will have marginally fewer Christians than it did in the previous session (2023-25), continuing a gradual, 10-year decline. Christians will make up 87% of voting members in the Senate and House of Representatives, combined, in the 2025-27 congressional session. That’s down from 88% in the last session and 92% a decade ago. Overall, there will be 461 Christian members of Congress when the 119th Congress meets, compared with 469 in the previous Congress and 491 during the 2015-17 session. It will be the lowest number of Christians since the start of the 2009-2011 congressional session, the first for which Pew Research Center conducted this analysis. (This analysis does not include three vacant – or soon to be vacant – seats whose eventual occupants are unknown, including the Ohio Senate seat of Vice President-elect JD Vance.) And yet, at 87%, Christians still make up the lion’s share of the Congress, far exceeding the Christian share of all U.S. adults, which stands at 62% after several decades of decline. In 2007, 78% of American adults were Christian, according to Pew Research Center’s Religious Landscape Study from that year, and in the early 1960s more than nine-in-ten U.S. adults were Christian, according to historical Gallup polling. The new Congress is also more religious than the general population by another, related measure: Nearly three-in-ten Americans (28%) are religiously unaffiliated, meaning they are atheist or agnostic or say their religion is “nothing in particular.” But less than 1% of Congress falls into this category, with three religiously unaffiliated members: incoming Reps. Yassamin Ansari of Arizona and Emily Randall of Washington, both of whom are Democrats, and incoming Rep. Abraham Hamadeh of Arizona, a Republican. While the share of the U.S. public that is religiously unaffiliated – sometimes called “nones” – has risen rapidly in recent decades (from 16% in 2007 to 28% in our recent polling), the corresponding share of Congress has remained miniscule. Prior to the 119th session, the only member of Congress who was categorized as religiously unaffiliated in our analyses was Kyrsten Sinema, independent of Arizona, who served from 2013 through the Congress that is just ending. (She did not run for reelection in 2024.) Pew Research Center’s analysis is based on data from CQ Roll Call, a publisher in Washington, D.C., that has closely covered Congress for decades. Breakdown by denomination Of the 461 Christians in the 119th Congress, 295 are Protestant, a decrease of eight from the previous session. Partial historical data suggests that Protestants had a much larger presence in Congress a few decades ago, including 398 members in 1961. But there have been fewer than 300 Protestants in six of the last nine sessions over the last decade and a half. That said, Protestants continue to make up a disproportionately high share of the 119th Congress (55% of members) when compared with the U.S. adult population (40%). Baptists are the largest category of Protestants in the new Congress, with 75 members (14.1% of Congress). That’s eight more Baptists than in the prior session. The next largest Protestant groups in the new Congress are Methodists (26 members), Presbyterians (26), Episcopalians (22) and Lutherans (19). These four groups have had shrinking U.S. memberships in recent decades and now have a considerably smaller presence in Congress than they used to. For example, in the 112th Congress of 2011-13, there were 51 Methodists, 45 Presbyterians, 41 Episcopalians and 26 Lutherans. Of the 295 Protestants in Congress, 101 do not specify a particular denomination or denominational family, instead giving broad or vague answers such as “Protestant,” “Christian” or “evangelical Protestant.” This is six fewer who identify in those ways than in the last Congress, but the overall trend during the last decade has been for increasing numbers of U.S. representatives and senators to give these kinds of answers. By comparison, only 58 members said they were “just Christians” or gave nonspecific, Protestant descriptions of their religious affiliation at the start of the 114th Congress in 2015. The new Congress also has 150 Catholics, two more than in

Annual report includes a five-year look at the relationship between religion-related government restrictions and social hostilities in each country This is the 15th in a series of annual reports by Pew Research Center analyzing the extent to which governments and societies around the world impinge on religious beliefs and practices. This analysis was produced by Pew Research Center as part of the Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures project, which analyzes religious change and its impact on societies around the world. Funding for the Global Religious Futures project comes from The Pew Charitable Trusts and the John Templeton Foundation (grant 63095). This publication does not necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation. To measure global restrictions on religion in 2022 – the most recent year for which data is available – the study rates 198 countries and territories by their levels of government restrictions on religion and social hostilities involving religion. The new study is based on the same 10-point indexes used in the previous studies. The Government Restrictions Index (GRI) measures government laws, policies and actions that restrict religious beliefs and practices. The GRI comprises 20 measures of restrictions, including efforts by governments to ban particular faiths, prohibit conversion, limit preaching or give preferential treatment to one or more religious groups. The Social Hostilities Index (SHI) measures acts of religious hostility by private individuals, organizations or groups in society. This includes religion-related armed conflict or terrorism, mob or sectarian violence, harassment over attire for religious reasons and other forms of religion-related intimidation or abuse. The SHI includes 13 measures of social hostilities. To track these indicators of government restrictions and social hostilities, researchers combed through more than a dozen publicly available, widely cited sources of information, including the U.S. State Department’s annual “Reports on International Religious Freedom” and annual reports from the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), as well as reports and databases from a variety of European and United Nations bodies and several independent, nongovernmental organizations. (Refer to the Methodology for more details on sources used in the study.) To learn more about the analysis for understanding the relationship between GRI and SHI scores, read the Methodology. Since 2007, Pew Research Center has analyzed religious restrictions in nearly 200 countries and territories around the world with two measures that are related but that also are very different: the Government Restrictions Index (GRI) and the Social Hostilities Index (SHI). The GRI measures restrictions by governments that can target people for their religious beliefs, as well as incidents in which governments use religious justifications to harass, intimidate or restrict people. The SHI, on the other hand, looks at religion-related hostilities by nongovernmental actors (i.e., private individuals and social groups). In 2022, the global median scores on both indexes stayed the same as they were in 2021, at 3.0 out of 10.0 on the Government Restrictions Index (its peak level) and at 1.6 out of 10.0 on the Social Hostilities Index. This is the Center’s 15th annual study of restrictions on religion. Before examining the 2022 findings in detail, we begin by examining the general relationship, in all countries, between levels of government restrictions and levels of social hostilities over the last five years of the study (2018 through 2022). In simple terms, the question we are asking is: Do countries in which government authorities pressure religious groups also tend to be places in which social groups and individuals are hostile toward religious groups? Similarly, do countries with relatively few government restrictions on religion also tend to be places with relatively few social hostilities involving religion? For the most part, the answer is yes: Government restrictions and social hostilities tend to go hand in hand. Over the five-year period, roughly three-quarters of all countries had either “high” or “very high” levels of both kinds of restrictions, or they had “low” or “moderate” levels of both kinds of restrictions. However, there are a sizable number of exceptions: About a quarter of all countries were in the high/very high range on one index and the low/moderate range on the other index. Here is a breakdown: 62% of the countries and territories analyzed (123 out of 198 studied) had low or moderate GRI scores and SHI scores, on average, from 2018 through 2022. For example, South Korea, Canada and the United States are among these countries. 12% (or 24 countries) had high or very high GRI scores and SHI scores, on average, in the same five-year period. Egypt and India are among these countries. 16% (or 32 countries) had high or very high GRI scores but had low or moderate SHI scores. China and Cuba are among these countries. 10% (or 19 countries) had low or moderate GRI scores but were in the high or very high range of SHI scores. Brazil and the Philippines are among these countries. Most countries that had high or very high GRI scores nevertheless had low or moderate SHI scores (32 of 56 countries, or 57%). Researchers looked at mean (i.e., average) GRI and SHI scores over the most recent five years of the study (2018-2022). This multiyear analysis reduces the impact of the year-to-year fluctuations that occur in the index scores of many individual countries, and thus offers a more stable set of scores. Background on the study Since 2007, Pew Research Center has been tracking restrictions on religion on two 10-point indexes: The Government Restrictions Index (GRI): Government restrictions on religion include laws, policies and actions that regulate or limit religious beliefs and practices. They also include policies that single out religious groups or ban particular beliefs or practices; the granting of benefits to some religious groups but not others; and bureaucratic rules that require religious groups to register to receive benefits. The Social Hostilities Index (SHI): Social hostilities include actions by private individuals or groups that target particular religious groups, often minorities. They can involve religion-related harassment, mob violence, terrorism and militant activity, as well as hostilities over religious conversions or the wearing of religious symbols and clothing. Countries with low or moderate

While ‘machismo’ has multiple meanings to Hispanics, most view it negatively Pew Research Center conducted this study to explore Hispanic Americans’ views of and experiences with the concept of machismo. The analysis in this report is based on Pew Research Center’s National Survey of Latinos, a survey of 5,078 Hispanic adults, conducted Nov. 6 to 19, 2023. This includes 1,524 respondents from the Center’s American Trends Panel and an additional 3,554 from Ipsos’ KnowledgePanel. Respondents on both panels are recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. Recruiting panelists by mail ensures that nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of selection. This gives us confidence that any sample can represent the whole population. (For more information, watch our Methods 101 explainer on random sampling.) In this survey, respondents were asked an open-ended question about what machismo means to them, and some quotations from those responses are used in this report. Quotations were selected for illustrative purposes and may have been edited for grammar, spelling and clarity. For more information on this survey, refer to its methodology and topline. The terms Hispanic and Latino are used interchangeably in this report. Immigrant refers to people born outside of the 50 U.S. states or the District of Columbia. For the purposes of this report, immigrant also refers to those born in Puerto Rico or other U.S. territories. Although individuals born in Puerto Rico are U.S. citizens by birth, they are grouped with immigrants because they are born into a Spanish-dominant culture and because on many points their attitudes, views and beliefs are much closer to those of Hispanics born outside the U.S. than to Hispanics born in the 50 states or D.C., even those who identify themselves as being of Puerto Rican origin. U.S. born refers to people born in the 50 U.S. states or D.C. Second generation refers to people born in the 50 U.S. states or D.C. with at least one immigrant parent. Third or higher generation refers to people born in the 50 U.S. states or D.C., with both parents born in the 50 U.S. states or D.C. Language dominance is a composite measure based on self-described assessments of speaking and reading abilities. Spanish-dominant people are more proficient in Spanish than in English (i.e., they speak and read Spanish “very well” or “pretty well” but rate their English-speaking and reading ability lower). Bilingual refers to people who are proficient in both English and Spanish. English-dominant people are more proficient in English than in Spanish. Democrats and Democratic leaners are respondents who identify politically with the Democratic Party or who identify politically as independent or with some other party but lean toward the Democratic Party. Republicans and Republican leaners are respondents who identify politically with the Republican Party or who identify politically as independent or with some other party but lean toward the Republican Party. For Hispanics living in the United States, conversations about gender can include discussions of “machismo,” a concept that generally captures ideas, behaviors and expectations related to men and masculinity that is sometimes attributed to Spanish-speaking cultures. A November 2023 Pew Research Center survey finds that a large majority of Latino adults in the U.S. (83%) have heard of machismo. And among those who have heard of it, 73% say machismo among Latinos is a bad thing. Overall, 60% of all Latino adults – including those who have not heard of machismo – see it negatively. For decades, conversations about machismo have taken place among Hispanics and non-Hispanics alike in American popular culture, higher education and politics. In the 2024 U.S. presidential election, Donald Trump’s campaign was sometimes seen as displaying traits linked to machismo in an effort to appeal to men of all backgrounds. In Latin America, conversations about machismo often focus on gender relations, including its links to toxic masculinity, sexism and gender-based violence. In recent years, governments across the region have launched campaigns against machismo to address some of these attitudes and behaviors. U.S. Latinos define machismo in many ways. In the survey, respondents who have heard of machismo were asked an open-ended question about what the term means to them. 25% say machismo is the belief that men are superior to or better than women. 22% say it means acting with emphasized or prideful masculinity. 19% say it is the belief that men and women should have certain roles in society based on gender. 17% say it means acting dominating or aggressive. There are substantial differences in Hispanics’ views of what machismo means by the primary language they speak and where they were born. Meanwhile, there are more modest differences by gender. In terms of personal behavior, 22% of Latino adults familiar with the term say they act in a way they consider to be consistent with machismo. Among men, 28% say they sometimes or often act this way, and among women, 17% say they do. These findings come from Pew Research Center’s bilingual National Survey of Latinos, conducted in November 2023 among a nationally representative sample of 5,078 Latino adults. ‘Machismo’ in history, scholarship and daily life Machismo is a word rooted in the Spanish language. However, both Spanish– and English-language scholarship have contributed to the development and popularization of the concept. Machismo and ideas related to it gained prominence throughout the 20th century, and by the late 1900s, it started to appear in popular culture outside of Latin America in music, entertainment, sports and beyond. In the last few decades, machismo has been studied as a range of traits tied to masculinity that can have negative, neutral or positive connotations. Others have tied machismo to negative impacts on Latinos’ mental and physical health.  Some have criticized machismo as a concept that portrays Hispanics as monolithic – stereotyping Hispanic men as overly aggressive and hypersexual and Hispanic women as subservient and passive. Critics have also described machismo as an idea imposed on Latinos by outside influences. Machismo is also closely related to marianismo, a concept focused on traditional roles and expectations

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How Latinos describe machismo is linked to their views on whether it is a good or bad thing and whether they say they behave in a way that is consistent with it. In general, Hispanics who have a negative perception of machismo are less likely to say they act in a way they consider consistent with the term.   Most Latinos who have heard of ‘machismo’ view it as a bad thing Nearly three-in-four Latinos (73%) who have heard of machismo say it is a very or somewhat bad thing among Latinos. Meanwhile, 7% say it is a very or somewhat good thing and 18% say it is neither. By Latinos’ descriptions of ‘machismo’ Nine-in-ten Latinos view the term machismo as the belief that men are superior to or better than women say it is a very or somewhat bad thing. Equal shares of those who describe machismo as acting in a dominating or aggressive way (88%) – or as the belief that men and women should have certain roles in society based on their gender (88%) – say it is a bad thing. Smaller shares of those who describe it in other ways say machismo is bad thing among Latinos: 61% who define machismo as acting strong, tough or unemotional say it is a bad thing. 53% who define machismo as acting with emphasized or prideful masculinity say it is a bad thing. And about a third who define it this way (32%) say it is neither a good nor bad thing. Roughly four-in-ten Latinos who define machismo as acting confident, chivalrous or protective (43%) see it negatively, while 23% see it positively. About one-third say it is neither positive nor negative (31%).   By gender Overall, 79% of Hispanic women and 66% of Hispanic men who have heard of machismo say it is a bad thing. While how Hispanics view machismo is generally linked to how they define it, there are some differences by gender among those who describe it the same way: 63% of Hispanic women who define machismo as acting with emphasized or prideful masculinity say it is a very or somewhat bad thing. A smaller share of Hispanic men who define it the same way (46%) say this. About 1 in 5 Latinos aware of ‘machismo’ say they behave in a way consistent with it Roughly one-in-five Latino adults (22%) who have heard of machismo say they act in a way that personifies the term. This includes 16% who say they sometimes act this way and 6% who say they extremely or very often do. By Latinos’ descriptions of ‘machismo’ Whether Latinos say they display machismo behavior is linked to how they define the concept. Among Latinos who define machismo as acting confident, chivalrous or protective, 35% say they often or sometimes act in a way that can be considered consistent with machismo. And 30% who define it as acting with emphasized or prideful masculinity say they act this way at least sometimes. Meanwhile, Latinos who describe machismo in other ways are less likely to say they often or sometimes act in a way that represents machismo. 16% who define it as acting dominating or aggressive say they behave in a way that is representative of machismo. 14% who define it as the belief that men are superior to or better than women say they act in a way representative of machismo. By gender Among those who are aware of the term machismo, Hispanic men (28%) are more likely than Hispanic women (17%) to say they act in a way that personifies the term. The shares who say they act this way still differ among men and women who agree on what the term means. Hispanic men who define machismo as acting with emphasized or prideful masculinity are much more likely than Hispanic women who define it this way to say they exhibit machismo behavior (45% vs. 10%). Hispanic men who describe machismo as acting strong, tough or unemotional are more likely than Hispanic women who use this definition to say their behavior at least sometimes exemplifies machismo (39% vs. 20%).   Meanwhile, similar shares of Hispanic men and women who define machismo as the belief that men are superior to women say they act in a way that is consistent with the term. (While machismo is often associated with men, both men and women can display machismo behavior.) For more details on Hispanics’ views of and experiences with machismo, including by age and political party, refer to the appendix. source