Pew Research Center

A median of 60% of adults across 25 nations say the spread of infectious diseases is a major threat to their country. A median of 30% say this is a minor threat, and 5% say it is not a threat. Concern about the spread of infectious diseases is generally higher in middle-income countries than high-income ones. A median of 85% across nine middle-income countries say this is a major threat, while a much smaller median share (53%) say this across 16 high-income countries. (Read Appendix A for more information on how we classify high- and middle-income countries.) In 16 of the 25 countries surveyed, majorities believe the spread of infectious diseases poses a major threat. This is the case in all nine middle-income countries included in the survey, but also in several high-income countries: France, Israel, Italy, Japan, Poland, South Korea and Spain. Views over time The share of people who say the spread of diseases poses a major threat has decreased since 2022 across nearly all the high-income countries included in the survey. For example, 28% of Germans now view the spread of infectious diseases as a major threat to their country, down from 49% in 2022. In 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, an even larger share of Germans (55%) held this view. Views by gender In 10 countries, women are more likely than men to say the spread of infectious diseases is a major threat to their nation. In Sweden, for example, women are 12 points more likely than men to see this as a major threat (39% vs. 27%). Gender differences also appear in Hungary, India, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, South Korea, Spain and the U.S. source

President Donald Trump’s current job approval rating stands at 38%, with 60% of U.S. adults expressing disapproval of his performance. This is a modest decline from two months ago, when 41% approved. And perceptions of some of Trump’s personal traits are more negative than they were following his election victory (or in 2024 preelection polling). For instance, 37% of Americans today say “cares about the needs of ordinary people” describes Trump well. That share is 8 points lower than it was shortly after the November election, and 5 points lower than it was in late-summer preelection polling. Trump’s job approval Much of the change in Trump’s approval rating over the last few months has come among his own 2024 voters and people who did not vote in 2024. Trump’s 2024 voters continue to overwhelmingly approve of his job performance – 85% do so today. However, this reflects a decline from 88% in June and 95% at the beginning of his term. Trump’s rating has slipped more among his younger voters than among older adults who cast their ballot for him. A few weeks into his presidency, Trump’s job approval rating among those who voted for him varied little by age. Nine-in-ten or more Trump voters under 35 approved of his job performance, as did similar shares of those in older age groups. Today, Trump’s rating remains overwhelmingly high among his voters ages 50 and older. But it has slipped considerably more among his youngest voters: 69% of Trump voters under 35 now approve of his job performance, down 23 points from the start of this term. Trump has also lost ground among adults who did not cast a ballot in 2024. Around a third (32%) approve of his performance today, down from 36% in June and 45% at the beginning of his term. Nearly all of those who voted for Kamala Harris in 2024 disapprove of Trump’s job performance. Just 2% currently approve, essentially unchanged over the last few months (though slightly lower than the 5% who approved at the very beginning of his term). Among demographic groups Today, 38% of Americans approve of the way Trump is handling his job as president, including 27% who approve very strongly. Six-in-ten disapprove, with nearly half (47%) saying they strongly disapprove. Trump’s approval is more negative than positive among most demographic groups. White Americans are modestly more likely to disapprove of the president than approve: 47% approve of Trump’s performance, while 52% disapprove. Clear majorities of Black (83%), Hispanic (70%) and Asian (66%) Americans disapprove of Trump’s handling of the job. Older adults continue to hold more positive views of Trump’s job performance than younger adults (44% of those ages 50 and older approve, compared with 33% of adults under 50). And while 41% of Americans without a bachelor’s degree approve of Trump’s performance, a smaller share of those with a bachelor’s degree (34%) say the same. Trump’s personal traits Most Americans (68%) say the phrase “stands up for what he believes in” describes Trump very or fairly well. Smaller shares say the same about the phrases “mentally sharp” (48%), “keeps his promises” (43%), “cares about the needs of ordinary people” (37%), “honest” (36%) or “a good role model” (29%). The share who sees Trump as someone who stands up for his beliefs and the share who sees him as honest are essentially the same as where they stood throughout the 2024 campaign. But Trump’s ratings on other measures are more negative today than they were throughout the campaign and shortly after his November victory. For instance, 48% today say “mentally sharp” describes Trump well. Throughout the 2024 campaign and shortly after the November election, more than half of Americans held this view. Views by party As in the past, there are wide partisan gaps on evaluations of the president’s traits. Republicans overwhelmingly say most of these traits apply to Trump, while few Democrats say the same. The partisan gaps are particularly wide(60 points or more) on the following traits: Mentally sharp (85% of Republicans say this describes Trump at least somewhat well, while just 14% of Democrats agree) Keeps his promises (76% vs. 13%) Cares about the needs of ordinary people (72% vs. 5%) Honest (69% vs. 7%) There are narrower – though still wide – partisan gaps on two other characteristics. Republicans are 43 points more likely than Democrats to say Trump stands up for what he believes in. This gap is narrower than others because Democrats are far more likely to say this characteristic applies to Trump than they are to say this about any of the other traits. Conversely, the relatively narrow 51-point gap on views of Trump as “a good role model” is attributable to the slim majority of Republicans who say this applies to Trump (56% vs. 5% of Democrats). source

President Donald Trump signs the “One Big Beautiful Bill Act” at the White House on July 4, 2025. (Brendan Smialowski/Pool/AFP via Getty Images) How we did this Pew Research Center conducted this study to understand how Americans view President Donald Trump and some of his administration’s major policies. For this analysis, we surveyed 3,554 adults from Aug. 4 to 10, 2025. Everyone who took part in this survey is a member of the Center’s American Trends Panel (ATP), a group of people recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses who have agreed to take surveys regularly. This kind of recruitment gives nearly all U.S. adults a chance of selection. Interviews were conducted either online or by telephone with a live interviewer. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education, presidential vote (among voters) and other factors. Read more about the ATP’s methodology. Here are the questions used for this report, the topline and the survey methodology. Six months into his second term, public evaluations of President Donald Trump’s job performance have grown more negative. His job approval stands at 38% (60% disapprove), and fewer Americans now attribute several positive personal characteristics to him than did so during the campaign. Two of the new administration’s signature accomplishments – the rollout of its tariff policies and the tax and spending law known as the “One Big Beautiful Bill” – garner considerably more disapproval than approval: 61% of Americans disapprove of Trump’s tariff policies, while 38% approve. 46% disapprove of the tax and spending law, while 32% approve (23% say they are unsure). While there are wide partisan divides over both initiatives – with Republicans largely supportive and Democrats largely in opposition – Democratic disapproval substantially outpaces Republican approval. Read Chapter 3 for more on views of Trump’s economic policies. The latest national survey by Pew Research Center – conducted Aug. 4-10 among 3,554 adults – also finds that a 53% majority say Trump is making the federal government work worse, while only about half as many (27%) say he is making the government work better. (Two-in-ten say he is making things about equally better and worse.) Both Republicans and Democrats now offer more negative assessments of Trump’s impact on the federal government than they had predicted in a survey conducted in the weeks immediately following Trump’s inauguration: 55% of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents now say Trump is improving the way the federal government works – while 16% say he’s making things worse and 29% say his effect is a mix of positive and negative. In the weeks after he took office, 76% of Republicans expected he would make government work better. 87% of Democrats and Democratic leaners say Trump is worsening the way government functions, up from 78% who said this at the beginning of his term. Trump’s job performance and personal traits Trump’s approval rating has slipped 3 percentage points over the last two months and is down 9 points since shortly after he took office. This drop is attributable to a combination of declining approval among his 2024 backers and adults who did not vote in November: The vast majority of Trump’s 2024 voters continue to approve of his job performance – but that share is down to 85% from 88% in June and 95% in the weeks after his inauguration. 32% of 2024 nonvoters now approve of Trump’s job performance – down from 36% in June and 45% at the beginning of his term. People who identify as strong Republicans continue to overwhelmingly approve of Trump’s job performance: 93% do so today, little different than the 96% who approved at the outset of his presidency. But there has been substantial erosion in his approval over this period among those who identify as Republicans but not strongly, as well as among independents who lean toward the GOP: About six-in-ten of those in these groups approve of Trump’s performance today, down from roughly three-quarters at the start of his second term. Public assessments of Trump on several personal traits are also more negative than they were in 2024. Fewer now say he cares about the needs of ordinary people (37% today, 42% last summer), is a good role model (29% now, 34% then) or is mentally sharp (48% now, 53% then). Trump is widely described as standing up for what he believes in: 68% say this today, identical to the share who said this last summer. Read Chapter 1 for more on Trump’s job approval and personal traits. Other key findings Fewer than half of Americans express confidence in Trump on key issues asked on the survey. But Americans express somewhat more confidence in Trump to negotiate trade agreements (47% are at least somewhat confident) and to handle immigration (46%) than on some other issues, including foreign policy (43%) and health care policy (38%). Read more in Chapter 2. Confidence in Trump to make wise decisions about the war between Ukraine and Russia is now lower than it was before he took office. Today, 40% of U.S. adults say they are at least somewhat confident in Trump’s decision-making on this conflict; last July, 45% expressed confidence. Republican confidence has declined by 8 percentage points over this period (73% of Republicans now say they are confident in Trump to handle this issue, down from 81% last summer). As was the case last year, only about one-in-ten Democrats express confidence in Trump to handle this issue. Related: How Americans view the Trump administration’s approach to the Russia-Ukraine war Seven-in-ten Americans disapprove of the Trump administration’s handling of information related to the investigation into Jeffrey Epstein, while 25% approve. GOP views are fairly divided (53% disapprove of the administration’s handling, while 44% approve), with disapproval higher among younger Republicans than older Republicans. Democrats overwhelmingly express disapproval (90%). Most Americans also distrust what the administration is saying about the Epstein issue: 63% say they have little or no trust in what the administration is saying, including 88% of Democrats and 38%

Over the past several months, the Trump administration has implemented key aspects of its economic policies by raising tariffs on nearly all U.S. trading partners and winning final congressional passage of its sweeping tax and budget bill, officially titled the “One Big Beautiful Bill Act.” The public’s views on these policies remain more negative than positive. A 61% majority of Americans disapprove of the Trump administration increasing tariffs on goods imported from most countries that trade with the United States, while 38% approve. These views are largely unchanged since April, shortly after Trump unveiled his far-reaching tariffs policy. Note: This survey was in the field on Aug. 7, when the Trump administration imposed higher import taxes on scores of countries, including tariffs as high as 50% for some countries.   By a wide margin, Republicans approve of the administration’s tariff and trade policies while Democrats overwhelmingly disapprove: 68% of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents approve of the increased tariffs. 89% of Democrats and Democratic leaners disapprove. Americans continue to express more negative than positive views of the GOP’s tax and budget legislation, which Trump signed into law on July 4. Only about a third (32%) approve of the legislation, while 46% disapprove. And by wide margins, more say the long-term effects of the legislation will be negative rather than positive. View of Trump’s handling of the economy also remain negative. A 55% majority say they are not too confident or not at all confident in Trump’s ability to make good decisions on economic policy, which is virtually unchanged from April. How will the Trump administration’s tariff policies impact the country and Americans personally? Majorities of Americans say the long-term effects of the administration’s tariff policies will be mostly negative for the country (55%) and for themselves and their families (also 55%). While there are partisan differences in these views, Republicans express mixed views of the impacts of the tariffs, while Democrats are largely negative.  The country as a whole More than twice as many Americans say the tariffs will have mostly negative effects on the country in coming years (55%) as say the effects will be mostly positive (26%). About one-in-five (19%) expect the effects will be about equally positive and negative. About half of Republicans and GOP leaners (52%) anticipate that the tariffs will benefit the country in the long term, while 27% see mixed positive and negative effects; 21% expect the tariffs to negatively affect the country in coming years. By comparison, nearly nine-in-ten Democrats and Democratic leaners (87%) say the tariffs will have negative effects on the country in coming years.     Americans and their families When asked about the effect of such policies on them and their families, overall views are similar: 55% of adults say they expect the personal impact to be mostly negative in coming years, while 21% say it will be mostly positive. Roughly a quarter say the effect will be about equally positive and negative. Notably, Republicans are less likely to say the tariffs will have mostly positive effects on themselves and their families (40%) than on the country (52%) in the coming years. They are somewhat more likely to say the personal impact will be mixed (35%, compared with 27% who say this about the country). Democrats, by contrast, are nearly as skeptical of the long-term personal impact of the tariffs (84% say it will be mostly negative) as they are of their effect on the country (87%). More Americans disapprove than approve of GOP’s tax and budget law Just over a month since being passed into law, the GOP’s “One Big Beautiful Bill” continues to be viewed more negatively than positively: 46% of Americans disapprove of the law, while 32% approve. Another 23% are not sure. These views have changed little since June, prior to the passing of the bill by the Senate, when 49% of adults said they opposed the budget and tax bill proposed by Trump and Republicans in Congress and 29% favored it. There continue to be wide partisan differences in views of the legislation: Six-in-ten Republicans say they approve of the budget and tax law, while 17% disapprove and 23% are not sure. Democrats disapprove of the law by an overwhelming margin (75% to 6%), with 18% not sure. Democratic opposition to the law is far more intense than Republican support for it. While 61% of Democrats strongly disapprove of the measure, just 21% of Republicans strongly approve. Overall, far more Americans say the tax and budget law will have mostly negative effects than mostly positive effects. Nearly half (47%) say the law will have a mostly negative effect on the country in coming years, while 25% expect mostly positive effects. About a quarter (26%) say the results will be mixed. Views are fairly similar regarding the law’s personal impact. As with overall opinions about the law, negative opinions about the effects of the law among Democrats far surpass positive views among Republicans. About eight-in-ten Democrats (78%) say the law’s effect on the country over the coming years will be mostly negative. A smaller share of Republicans (48%) say it will have a mostly positive impact. Partisans are similarly divided when it comes to the effect of the budget and tax law on them and their families: Seven-in-ten Democrats say the impact of the law will be mostly negative on them and their families, and 46% of Republicans say it will be mostly positive. source

Over the past six months, Americans have become less supportive of Donald Trump’s policies and plans — and more likely to say that Trump is making the way the federal government works worse. But wide partisan divides remain, with Republicans being far more likely than Democrats to express confidence in Trump on both domestic and foreign policy issues. Trump’s policies and plans Both Republicans and Democrats have become less likely to express support for Trump’s policies in recent months: 58% of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents say they support all or most of Trump’s policies, down from two-thirds earlier this year. 88% of Democrats and Democratic leaners say they support few or none of Trump’s policies, a modest increase from the 84% who said the same in February. This includes 51% who say they support none of Trump’s policies and plans. Trump’s influence on the way government works A narrow majority of Americans (53%) say Trump is making the way the federal government works worse, nearly double the share who say he is making it better (27%). Two-in-ten say Trump is making the government function about equally better and worse. While there are wide partisan differences in perceptions of Trump’s impact on the federal government, both Democrats and Republicans have become more negative in their assessments than they were at the start of his term. Democrats (87%) overwhelmingly say Trump is making the way the government works worse. A few weeks into his presidency, 78% predicted that he would make this worse. While a 55% majority of Republicans say Trump is making the government work better, that is 21 percentage points lower than the share who expected he would make things better six months ago. The share of Republicans saying he is making things worse is also up, from 7% to 16%, over that period. Confidence in Trump’s ability to handle issues Across most domestic and foreign policy issues, Americans express less confidence in Trump than they did in the period leading up to his election in November. However, views are little changed in recent months. Fewer than half of Americans express confidence in Trump on any of the 12 issues asked about on the survey, but he performs better on some issues than others: 47% say they are at least somewhat confident in his ability to negotiate favorable trade agreements with other countries. 46% express confidence in Trump to make good decisions about immigration and use military force wisely. But substantially smaller shares are confident in Trump’s ability to bring the country closer together (31%) or work well with Democratic elected officials (27%). Views among Republicans Wide majorities of Republicans are at least somewhat confident in Trump on most of these measures, including his ability to: Make good decisions about immigration and use military force wisely (83% each) Negotiate trade agreements with other countries, effectively handle law enforcement and criminal justice issues, and respond effectively to natural disasters (81% each) Make good decisions about economic (80%), foreign (79%), tax (77%) and health care (72%) policy Manage the executive branch effectively (77%) By comparison, much smaller shares of Republicans express confidence in Trump’s ability to bring the country closer together (56%) or work well with Democratic elected officials (49%). (Note that the survey was conducted prior to Trump’s announcement that he would federalize the District of Columbia’s Metropolitan Police Department and deploy the National Guard to combat crime in the city.) Views among Democrats Across the full set of domestic and foreign policy issues, small shares of Democrats express confidence in Trump’s ability – no more than 15% of Democrats express confidence in Trump on any (15% say have confidence in him on negotiating trade deals), with even smaller shares expressing confidence in him on several of the issues (including working well with Democrats, making good decisions about health care policy and bringing the country closer together). Confidence in Trump on foreign policy issues Seven-in-ten or more Republicans say they are at least somewhat confident that Trump can make wise decisions across a series of foreign policy issues, while no more than two-in-ten Democrats say the same. Most of these views are little changed from last July, during the presidential campaign. But confidence in Trump’s decision-making on the war between Ukraine and Russia is lower than it was last year, particularly among Republicans. Today, 40% of Americans are at least somewhat confident in Trump to make wise decisions about the Ukraine-Russia conflict, down from 45% last summer. And while 73% of Republicans express confidence today, that is down from 81% a year ago. Related: How Americans view the Trump administration’s approach to the Russia-Ukraine war source

(Pew Research Center illustration; photo via Getty Images) How we did this Pew Research Center conducted this study to understand Americans’ experiences with and views of online scams and attacks. For this analysis, we surveyed 9,397 adults from April 14 to 20, 2025. Everyone who took part in this survey is a member of the Center’s American Trends Panel (ATP), a group of people recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses who have agreed to take surveys regularly. This kind of recruitment gives nearly all U.S. adults a chance of selection. Interviews were conducted either online or by telephone with a live interviewer. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other factors. Read more about the ATP’s methodology. Here are the questions used for this report, the topline and the survey methodology. Online scams and other internet crimes are skyrocketing, with a record $16.6 billion in losses reported to the FBI in 2024. The federal government, banks and companies are all sounding alarms. And the public is also wary, with many having firsthand experience: Nearly all Americans view online scams and attacks as a national problem. More than nine-in-ten say online scams and attacks are a problem in the country, including 79% who describe them as a major problem. Most U.S. adults have been a victim of an online scam or attack. We find that 73% of U.S. adults have ever experienced things like credit card fraud, ransomware or online shopping scams. While Americans see older adults as more vulnerable to these crimes, significant portions of both older and younger adults have been scammed and targeted online. These are some of the key findings from a Pew Research Center survey of 9,397 U.S. adults conducted from April 14 to 20, 2025. We asked Americans if six different types of online scams or attacks had happened to them. Overall, about three-quarters (73%) say at least one has, with 32% saying it’s happened in the past year. Of the six, Americans most commonly report that online hackers made fraudulent charges on their credit or debit card. About half of U.S. adults (48%) report this has happened to them. Roughly a quarter to a third report that three other types of scams happened to them:   36% say they purchased an item online that never arrived or was counterfeit and it was not refunded. 29% say a personal online account was hacked, such as a social media, email or bank account. 24% say they got a scam email, text message or call that led them to give away personal information. One-in-ten or fewer say the remaining two scams and online attacks happened: 10% say that ransomware blocked use of their computer until they paid money. 7% say they gave money to a fake online investment opportunity, such as for real estate or stocks. Many Americans have had multiple types of online scams happen to them. About one-in-five (22%) say they’ve experienced two of six, and the same share say three or more. By age Large portions of both older and younger adults report that scams and online attacks have happened to them. About three-quarters of adults under 30, as well as those ages 30 to 49 and 50 to 64, report ever experiencing an online scam or attack. A slightly smaller share of those 65 and older (66%) report the same. Additionally, experiencing multiple types of scams or attacks is roughly on par across age groups. By race and ethnicity While there are no differences between racial and ethnic groups in experiencing at least one of the scams or attacks, Black, Hispanic and Asian adults are more likely than White adults to have had multiple forms of these frauds happen to them. For example, about three-in-ten Black or Hispanic adults have faced three or more types of online scams or attacks, compared with 18% of White adults. By income Americans in households across income levels are about as likely to say they’ve ever experienced at least one of the online scams. But those in households with lower incomes are more likely to say at least three have happened. Go to the Appendix for a demographic breakdown of each of the six scams and online attacks. Scam messages Online scams target Americans in variety of ways, including phone calls, texts and emails. According to our survey, a majority of U.S. adults report getting scam phone calls (68%), emails (63%) or text messages (61%) at least weekly that attempt to get their personal information. One-third get these messages on social media at the same frequency. These attempts to get personal information aren’t just a weekly occurrence; for some, they’re a daily reality. 31% say they get scam phone calls at least daily, including 21% who say this happens several times a day. 28% say they get daily scam emails. 20% encounter this by text message on a daily basis. Fewer (11%) say the same for social media. Go to the Appendix for the demographic breakdown of those who have experienced scam messages in each way. Financial losses and impact on financial well-being More money is being lost to online scams and cybercriminals than ever before, according to the FBI. In our survey, roughly one-in-five U.S. adults (21%) say they have ever lost money because of an online scam or attack. By age Younger Americans are slightly more likely than their older counterparts to say they have lost money because of an online scam or attack. About a quarter of 18- to 29-year-olds say they’ve lost money in this way, compared with 15% of those 65 and older. By race and ethnicity There are also differences by race and ethnicity. Black, Hispanic and Asian adults are more likely than White adults to say they have lost money because of an online scam or attack. By household income Those with lower incomes (26%) are more likely than those in upper-income households (15%)

ABOUT PEW RESEARCH CENTER Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan, nonadvocacy fact tank that informs the public about the issues, attitudes and trends shaping the world. It does not take policy positions. The Center conducts public opinion polling, demographic research, computational social science research and other data-driven research. Pew Research Center is a subsidiary of The Pew Charitable Trusts, its primary funder. source

In 2020, Pew Research Center launched a new project called the National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS). NPORS is an annual, cross-sectional survey of U.S. adults. Respondents can answer by paper, online or over the phone, and they are selected using address-based sampling from the United States Postal Service’s Computerized Delivery Sequence File. The rigorous design of NPORS results in a response rate around 30%. NPORS estimates are separate from the American Trends Panel (ATP) – the Center’s national online survey platform. Pew Research Center launched NPORS to address a limitation that researchers observed in the ATP. While the ATP was well-suited for the vast majority of the Center’s U.S. survey work, estimates for a few outcomes were not in line with other high-quality surveys, even after weighting to demographics like age, education, race and ethnicity and gender. For example, in 2018, roughly one-quarter of U.S. adults were religiously unaffiliated (i.e., atheist, agnostic or “nothing in particular”), according to the General Social Survey (GSS) and the Center’s own telephone-based polling. The ATP, however, estimated the religiously unaffiliated rate at about 32%. The Center did not feel comfortable publishing that ATP estimate because there was too much evidence that the rate was too high, likely because the types of people willing to participate in an online panel skew less religious than the population as a whole. Similarly, the ATP estimate for the share of U.S. adults identifying as a Democrat or leaning to the Democratic Party was somewhat higher than the rate indicated by the GSS and our own telephone surveys. From 2014 to late 2020, the Center approached these outcomes slightly differently. We addressed the political partisanship issue by weighting every ATP survey to an external benchmark for the share of Americans identifying as a Republican, Democrat or independent. For the benchmark, we used the average of the results from our three most recent national cellphone and landline random-digit-dial (RDD) surveys.  During this time period, ATP surveys were not weighted to an external benchmark for Americans’ religious affiliation. The ATP was used for some research on religious beliefs and behaviors, but it was not used to estimate the overall share of Americans identifying as religiously affiliated or unaffiliated, nor was it used to estimate the size of particular faith groups, such as Catholics, Protestants or the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. NPORS allows us to improve and harmonize our approach to both these outcomes (Americans’ political and religious affiliations).  Design and estimates Read our fact sheet to find the latest NPORS estimates as well as methodological details. Data collection for NPORS was performed by Ipsos from 2020 through 2023 and is now performed by SSRS.  Why is the NPORS response rate higher than most opinion polls? Several features of NPORS set it apart from a typical public opinion poll.  People can respond offline or online. NPORS offers three different ways to respond: by paper (through the mail), online, or by telephone (by calling a provided phone number and speaking to a live interviewer). The paper and telephone options bring in more conservative, more religious adults who are less inclined to take surveys online. Monetary incentives. When sampled adults are first asked to respond to NPORS online, the mailing contains a $2 incentive payment (cash visible from the outside of the envelope) and offers a $10 incentive payment contingent on the participant completing the survey. When nonrespondents to that first stage are sent the paper version of the survey, the mailing contains a visible $5 bill. These incentives give people a reason to respond, even if they might not be interested in the questions or inclined to take surveys in general.  Priority mailing. The paper version of the survey is mailed in a USPS Priority Mail envelope, which is more expensive than a normal envelope, signaling that the contents are important and that the mailing is not haphazard. It helps people distinguish the survey from junk mail, increasing the likelihood that they open and read what is inside.  Low burden. The NPORS questionnaire is intentionally kept short. It’s about 40 questions long, including demographics such as age, gender and education. This means that NPORS takes about seven minutes to finish, while many polls take 10 minutes or longer.  Bilingual materials. In parts of the country with sizable shares of Hispanic Americans, the materials are sent in both English and Spanish.  No requirement to join a panel. NPORS respondents are not required to join a survey panel, which for some people would be a reason to decline the request.  These features are not possible in most public polls for a host of reasons. But NPORS is designed to produce estimates of high enough quality that they can be used as weighting benchmarks for other polls, and so these features are critical. Why a ‘reference’ survey for public opinion? The “R” in NPORS stands for “reference.” In this context, the term comes from studies in which researchers calibrate a small sample survey to a large, high-quality survey with greater precision and accuracy. Examples of reference surveys used by researchers include the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS) and the Current Population Survey (CPS). NPORS is not on the scale of the ACS or CPS, nor does it feature face-to-face data collection. But it does have something that those studies lack: timely estimates of key public opinion outcomes. Other studies like the American National Election Survey (ANES) and the General Social Survey collect key public opinion measures, but their data is released months, if not years, after data collection. NPORS is truly a reference survey for Pew Research Center because researchers weight each American Trends Panel wave to several NPORS estimates. In other words, ATP surveys refer to NPORS in order to represent groups like Republicans, Democrats, religiously affiliated adults and religiously unaffiliated adults proportional to their share of the U.S. population. The ATP weighting protocol also calibrates to other benchmarks, such as ACS demographic figures and CPS benchmarks for voter registration status and volunteerism. Pew Research Center is weighting on political party affiliation, but isn’t

People walk through a shopping area in a historic neighborhood of Beijing on Oct. 3, 2024. (Kevin Frayer/Getty Images) How we did this This Pew Research Center analysis focuses on public opinion of China in 25 countries across the Asia-Pacific region, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East-North Africa region, North America and sub-Saharan Africa. Views of China, its president and its role in the world are examined in the context of long-term trend data.  For non-U.S. data, this analysis draws on nationally representative surveys of 28,333 adults conducted from Jan. 8 to April 26, 2025. All surveys were conducted over the phone with adults in Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Surveys were conducted face-to-face in Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Israel, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa and Turkey. In Australia, we used a mixed-mode probability-based online panel.  In the United States, we surveyed 3,605 U.S. adults from March 24 to 30, 2025. Everyone who took part in this survey is a member of the Center’s American Trends Panel (ATP), a group of people recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses who have agreed to take surveys regularly. This kind of recruitment gives nearly all U.S. adults a chance of selection. Surveys were conducted either online or by telephone with a live interviewer. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the ATP’s methodology.  We conducted simultaneous telephone and face-to-face surveys in Hungary and Poland in 2024. Data in our 2024 reports was from the face-to-face survey. The 2024 data in this report comes from the telephone survey for direct comparison to our 2025 telephone data. For this reason, 2024 data for Hungary and Poland may not match earlier reports. Here are the questions used for this analysis, along with responses, and the survey methodology. What is a median? In this analysis, median scores are used to help readers see overall patterns in the data. The median percentage is the middle number in a list of all percentages sorted from highest to lowest. The share of people with a favorable view of China has increased since last year in 15 of the 25 countries Pew Research Center surveyed this spring. In most of these countries, this is the first time since 2020 that views of China have turned more positive. After the COVID-19 pandemic began, opinions of China in some places reached historic or near-historic lows in survey data going back nearly two decades.  Confidence in Chinese President Xi Jinping to do the right thing regarding world affairs has also increased in many countries surveyed. Despite these changes, views of China and Xi remain broadly negative: A median of 36% of adults across the 25 countries surveyed have a favorable view of China, while 54% have an unfavorable view. A median of 25% have confidence in Xi, compared with 66% who have little or no confidence in him. While the balance of opinion is negative overall, views of China and Xi vary significantly across the countries surveyed. China and its president receive much more positive marks in the nine middle-income countries surveyed than in the 16 high-income ones. Jump to Chapter 3 to read more about views of China and Xi in middle-income countries. Though views of China and Xi have improved in most surveyed countries since last year, the opposite is true for the United States and President Donald Trump. Today, international views of the two superpowers and their leaders are closer than they have been at any point since 2020. Related: Views of the U.S. have worsened while opinions of China have improved in many countries Against this backdrop, more people globally see China as the world’s leading economic power now versus when we last asked in 2023. Today, a median of 41% of adults across the countries surveyed see China as the world’s top economy, while roughly the same share (39% median) give that title to the U.S. This is a marked departure from two years ago, when considerably more people saw the U.S. than China as the world’s leading economy. Despite the growing sense that China is the world’s top economy, people in nearly all countries surveyed prioritize strong economic ties with the U.S. over China.  This is the case even though the share of people who prioritize economic ties with China has grown in more than half of the countries where we’ve asked this question before. In Mexico, for instance, 45% of adults now say it’s more important for their country to have strong economic ties with China than with the U.S., up from 37% in 2019 and 15% in 2015. Some of this movement may be related to confidence (or lack of confidence) in Trump to handle global economic problems. In most nations surveyed, people with less confidence in Trump on this issue are more likely to prioritize strong economic ties with China.  These are some of the key findings from a new Pew Research Center survey of more than 30,000 people in 25 countries conducted Jan. 8-April 26, 2025. Fieldwork in every country except Indonesia began after Trump’s second-term inauguration. Most interviews were conducted before Trump announced sweeping global tariffs on April 2. Refer to Appendix A for more information on our survey fieldwork timeline.  Attitudes toward China in middle-income nations Our survey takes a close look at attitudes toward China, as well as the U.S., in nine middle-income countries.  Investment from China and the U.S. Around half of adults or more in nearly every middle-income country we surveyed – except Argentina and India – see investment from China as good for their nation. And the share who express this view has increased substantially since 2019 in Turkey (+20 percentage points), Indonesia (+18), Kenya (+11) and India (+9). It has decreased considerably in Nigeria (-18).  We also asked people about investment from the U.S. In Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey, more people describe investment from China as good for their country

Views of China are more unfavorable than favorable in the 25 countries surveyed. In most countries, people also lack confidence in Chinese President Xi Jinping to do the right thing regarding world affairs.  However, positive views of China have increased in 15 of the 25 countries since last year, and confidence in Xi is up in 16 countries. Views of both China and Xi tend to be more positive in the nine middle-income countries surveyed than in the 16 high-income countries. Favorability of China A 25-country median of 36% of adults have a favorable view of China, compared with 54% who have an unfavorable view.  Views are among the most negative in the Asia-Pacific region. In Japan, only 13% of people have a favorable view of China, as do around a quarter or fewer in Australia, India and South Korea. Indonesia, however, is an exception, with roughly two-thirds reporting a favorable opinion of China. The balance of opinion in Europe is also negative. About four-in-ten adults or fewer have a positive view of China in most of the European countries surveyed. Only in Greece do a majority have a favorable opinion. In both Turkey and Israel, around a third have favorable views of China. In the three sub-Saharan African countries surveyed (Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa) majorities have a favorable view of China. And in each of the three Latin American countries surveyed (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) more people have a positive view of China than a negative one.  The more positive views in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America reflect a broader pattern: In countries with lower gross domestic products per capita, people tend to have more positive views of China. Views of China over time Views of China have become more favorable since 2024 in 15 of 25 countries surveyed. This includes double-digit increases in places like Canada and France (+13 points) as well as Italy and South Africa (+10). In South Korea, however, the share of adults with a favorable view of China decreased from 25% in 2024 to 19% in 2025. This is the only country surveyed where this share has dropped significantly since last year. Related: Negative Views of China Have Softened Slightly Among Americans Views by age In most countries, younger people have more favorable opinions of China than older people.  Some of the largest gaps are in Poland, the United Kingdom and Canada, where adults under 35 are 27 or 28 points more likely than those ages 50 and older to view China positively.  Views by ideology In most countries, ideology is not closely related to views of China. (For more on how we measure ideology in our cross-national surveys, read this report’s methodology.) But in Israel, Mexico, South Korea and the U.S., people who place themselves on the ideological left (“liberals” in the U.S.) have more positive views of China than those on the ideological right (“conservatives” in the U.S.). For example, 28% of South Koreans on the left view China positively, compared with 12% of those on the right. In Hungary, however, the opposite is true. Roughly two-thirds of Hungarians on the right have favorable views of China, compared with 43% in the center and 37% on the left.  Confidence in Xi Relatively few people surveyed have confidence in Xi to do the right thing regarding world affairs. A 25-country median of 25% of adults have a fair amount or a great deal of confidence in him, while 66% have not too much or no confidence at all.  Ratings of Xi are highest in Kenya and Nigeria, where about two-thirds of adults have confidence in the Chinese president. Views are more mixed in South Africa. In Europe, Latin America and North America, assessments of Xi are more negative than positive. The same is true in Turkey and Israel. People in four of the five Asia-Pacific countries surveyed mostly lack confidence in Xi. For instance, only 8% in Japan have confidence in him. But in Indonesia, more have confidence in Xi than not (53% vs. 41%).  Overall, confidence in Xi is lower in high-income countries than in middle-income ones. Views of Xi over time While majorities in most countries surveyed have little or no confidence in Xi to do the right thing regarding world affairs, confidence in him has increased since last year in 16 of the 25 countries surveyed. This includes increases of 10 points in Canada and Turkey. These changing attitudes toward Xi reflect another pattern: The share saying they “don’t know” whether they have confidence in him has fallen in some countries. And in South Africa the share who are unsure or decline to answer has dropped so significantly since 2024 that both positive (+10) and negative (+12) ratings of Xi have increased.  source