Allocations by institutional investors, represented by public pensions, have plateaued in recent years. This is unsurprising given the sheer volume of capital already committed, combined with the fact that private equity, the larger of the two allocations, has failed to deliver returns comparable to public markets for many years.
The tapering of new institutional commitments, coupled with a clogged exit environment, created pressure across the private-markets ecosystem. Asset managers still had large portfolios to finance, consultants still had asset classes to recommend, and distributors still needed new products to sell. The solution was a structural innovation that allowed the industry to expand its investor base: semi-liquid vehicles designed specifically for individual investors and marketed as the “democratization” of private markets.
These structures typically offer periodic liquidity, often through quarterly redemption windows, while investing in assets that may take years to sell at reliable prices. The appeal is obvious. Investors are offered exposure to private markets together with the appearance of stability and the reassurance that they can redeem capital periodically.
The problem is that this model violates the previously explained principle of finance. Long-duration, difficult-to-price assets should never be financed with short-term liabilities unless a lender of last resort stands behind the structure. When that rule is ignored, the structure is unstable. As long as inflows continue and redemptions remain manageable, it seems advantageous to both investors and fund managers. But once investors begin to withdraw capital, the mismatch between liquidity promises and underlying assets becomes visible very quickly.
History provides many examples of this dynamic. Wildcat banks in the 1800s, trust companies in the early 1900s, and investment bank warehousing facilities in the early 2000s. In each case, when confidence weakened, investors rationally attempted to redeem before others did. It doesn’t take long before investors run, simply in anticipation of other people running – which is the hallmark of a bank or fund run. This risk is substantially amplified when individual investors provide a large percentage of the capital.
Taken together, semi-liquid private credit and private equity funds are unusually vulnerable to run mechanisms. Not only are Illiquid assets financed with redeemable capital, but the underlying investments were raised at the tail-end of two aged investment cycles. Financial history suggests that such combinations rarely remain stable for very long. They may function smoothly for several years. But when confidence weakens, the structural mismatch becomes impossible to ignore.
That day arrived on February 18, when Blue Owl announced that it had permanently eliminated quarterly liquidity in its OBDC II private credit fund.
